

CEE Outlook 2026

Growing divergence, sustained fiscal and governance challenges

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

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Scope's CEE sovereign rating portfolio – latest rating actions


- Three upgrades and one Positive Outlook; four Negative Outlook revisions. Result: increasing rating dispersion across the CEE region in 2025.
- Positive momentum from EU-funded investment, reform progress and external rebalancing supports selective upside (e.g. HR).
- Downside pressures stem from structural fiscal strain, governance challenges, and insufficient reform momentum.



*as of 9 December 2025. The chart displays long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency. Ukraine currently in selective default. Source: Scope Ratings

Scope's CEE sovereign rating portfolio – Rating levels

- Two sovereigns have Negative Outlooks (Slovakia, Georgia), reflecting fiscal and governance-related pressures.
- One sovereign has a Positive Outlook (Croatia), supported by sustained reform momentum and euro-area integration benefits.
- The overall Outlook balance remains mildly negative, signaling continued divergence in credit trajectories across the region.



* As of 9 December 2025. Source: Scope Ratings

Key sovereign CEE themes 2026

- Growth will hinge on external demand and effective absorption of EU funds, crucial for investment, productivity, and external-balance improvements.
- Institutional frictions continue to weigh on policymaking, undermining reform momentum and creating uncertainty around EU-fund conditionality.
- CEE sovereigns enter 2026 with elevated structural challenges, including fiscal pressures, demographic headwinds and persistent external vulnerabilities.

Growth & EU funds

Ample EU funds allocations support growth and external resilience, but approaching RRF deadline raises **absorption risks**, exposing countries with administrative bottlenecks (HU, BG, RO).

External headwinds remain, with soft demand from Germany and core EU markets weighing on export-oriented economies (CZ, SK, HU).

Persistent uncertainty in US–EU trade relations adds pressure on industrial exporters, particularly in Slovakia, but also in Czechia and Hungary.

External sector risks

External pressures stem from recent trade policy shocks, dependence on energy imports and uneven reserve buffers.

Higher-risk profiles: Romania (persistent CA deficits), Hungary (energy import dependence, reliance on foreign capital, unresolved EU-fund issues), Slovakia (highly concentrated export base).

Lower-risk but still exposed: the Baltics, Croatia and Lithuania show stronger buffers but remain vulnerable to global demand weakness and renewed energy-price volatility.

Persistent fiscal deficits & rising debt

The most pronounced challenges are in Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, given widening structural gaps and significant spending pressures.

Even sovereigns with stronger fiscal fundamentals (Baltics, Czechia, Croatia) face rising demands from defence, ageing and softer revenue growth; under-delivering on consolidation plans would increase downward rating pressure.

Governance & EU conditionality

Reform momentum remains vulnerable to institutional frictions in Poland, political polarisation in Romania, and fragmentation in Slovakia.

Persistent uncertainty around the unfreezing of EU funds in **Hungary** continues to weigh on investment prospects and external resilience.

Upcoming electoral cycles and shifting coalitions across the region may alter fiscal trajectories and delay structural reforms, reinforcing governance-related rating risks.

Structural risks & ESG

Demographic decline and labour shortages, such as in the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Czechia, continue to limit potential growth.

High sector concentration, notably in the automotive industries of Slovakia, Czechia and Hungary, heightens exposure to tariff risks, EV-transition uncertainty and supply-chain shocks.


Tourism-reliant economies (Croatia, Türkiye) face cyclical and climate-related vulnerabilities, while persistent productivity gaps and green-transition pressures weigh on cost competitiveness.

1. Growth & EU funds




Diverging growth prospects

- Weak external demand and global trade uncertainties continue to weigh on export-oriented economies such as Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia.
- Elevated EU-funded public investment support a firmer medium-term outlook for several CEE sovereigns.
- Widening growth divergence: investment and structural reforms (HR, BG); competitiveness pressures and slower productivity gains (HU, RO).





Source: IMF, Scope Ratings



Data as of 20 November 2025. Source: European Commission, Scope Ratings

EU funds underpin medium-term growth; absorption capacity remains key constraint

- RRF disbursements are set to accelerate ahead of the August 2026 deadline, though several countries face significant delays or persistent constraints – including bottlenecks in Poland and partial freezes in Hungary and Bulgaria.
- Cohesion Fund absorption under the 2021–27 MFF lags the previous cycle, unlocking these funds will test countries' implementation capacity.




Data as of end-November 2025. Source: European Commission, Scope Ratings

Easing funding conditions will support growth across most of the region


- Disinflation is progressing across CEE, though Romania faces a temporary setback due to tax changes and Hungary remains exposed to FX volatility
- Monetary policy easing is underway, but at a slower pace in Hungary and Romania as inflation risks persist, moderating the growth impulse
- Falling funding costs and improving financial conditions are set to support investment and domestic demand across most of the region

Headline inflation Annual average, %



Source: Eurostat, national statistical offices, Scope Ratings

Key policy rates %




Source: National central banks, Scope Ratings

2. External sector risks




Different degrees of exposure to a shifting global trade environment


- Manufacturing hubs: US tariffs and rising Chinese competition weigh most on export-dependent producers, especially Slovakia.
- Sectoral buffers: specialisation in less exposed industries, such as Slovenia’s pharmaceuticals, helps mitigate external risks.
- Services diversification: growing services exports, such as in Lithuania and the Czech Republic, reduce sensitivity to global goods-trade shocks.



Source: UNCTAD, Scope Ratings




Source: Eurostat, Scope Ratings




Source: Eurostat, Scope Ratings

Current account balance, NIIP & reserves

- External accounts are expected to remain broadly stable, as export growth recovers and import demand strengthens with higher public investment.
- Deficits continue to fuel Romania's large current-account gaps, heightening its vulnerability to changes in external financing conditions.



Source: IMF WEO forecasts for Ukraine, Turkey and Georgia, European Commission AMECO forecasts for other, Scope Ratings



Source: IMF, Macrobond, Scope Ratings
Note: Reserve adequacy as measured by the IMF ARA metric (latest figure available)


3. Persistent fiscal deficits & rising debt



Persistent fiscal deficits and rising government debt levels

- Fiscal consolidation remains uneven across the region, with deficits staying persistently high and pushing government debt onto a rising trajectory
- Medium-term debt dynamics are deteriorating in several sovereigns, increasing vulnerability to shocks.
- Delays or shortfalls in implementing planned consolidation measures would heighten downward rating pressure.

Change in primary balance (2030F vs 2024), % of GDP




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings forecasts

Note: Euro-area (EA) members are shown in blue, non-EA EU members are shown in shaded-blue, rest of world is shown in red. Dot sizes reflect the projected debt-to-GDP ratios for 2030, in relative terms.

Persistent fiscal deficits and rising government debt levels

- Persistent primary deficits remain the main driver of upward debt dynamics for most CEE sovereigns.
- Still-solid growth prospects are expected to offset real interest rates in several economies (HR, TR, SI), helping to limit the pace of leverage accumulation.


Drivers of changes in debt-to-GDP ratio, 2024-30, pps of GDP




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings forecasts

Continuous spending pressures; favourable funding from SAFE loans

- Some CEE countries are already close to or above the new NATO 3.5% of GDP spending target (LT, LV, PL, EE); others still face a material spending gap.
- Alongside defence, growing interest payments are a key structural spending pressure; population ageing has an uneven effect on public finances.
- Large lending flows on favourable terms under the EU SAFE programme will alleviate funding pressures associated with the ramp-up in defence spending.



Source: European Commission - 2024 Ageing Report, NATO, IMF, Scope Ratings.
Note: Defence spending as defined according to NATO accounting standards.




Tentative allocation from August 2025 as communicated by the European Commission, following the expression of interests. Source: European Commission, Eurostat, Scope Ratings.

3. Governance & EU conditionality




Governance decisions and key elections out to 2030

- Governance frictions and elections heighten policy and fiscal uncertainty heading into 2026.
- Potential disruptions to RRF or Cohesion Fund access remain a downside risks for the macro-fiscal outlook and external resilience.




Governance – specific country developments


- Governance and institutional fragmentation present risks to EU funding and prudent budget management.
- Upcoming elections in Hungary in 2026 may bring about an historic shift, with opposition party Tisza currently leading in the polls.
- The cohabitation of presidency and parliament in Poland should continue until 2027 at the earliest, hindering the reform momentum.
- ANO likely to lead new coalition government in Czechia, potentially resulting in more critical approach towards the EU.



*Polls as of 25 November 2025. Source: Eurostat, Politico, Scope Ratings




Source: Scope Ratings




Source: PolitPro, Scope Ratings

4. Structural risks & ESG




Net immigration helps offset workforce decline, but shortages and skill gaps remain


- High labour force participation, but elevated unemployment rate (LV, LT, EE) and high vacancy rate (CZ) signal some skill mismatches and labour shortage.
- Improved migration balance given escalation of Ukraine war temporarily eased demographic pressures but does not resolve long-term workforce decline.



Note: the colour of the dots represents the level of the vacancy rate.
Source: Eurostat, Scope Ratings




Source: UNCTAD, IMF, Scope Ratings



Source: World Bank, Eurostat, UNCTAD, Scope Ratings


Status and challenges of the green transition

- Challenges in simultaneously boosting the share of renewables and cutting energy intensity point to structural regional difficulties in the green transition.
- High energy import dependency (GE, LT, TR, HU, SK, HR) increases vulnerability to economic and geopolitical shocks.



Note: axes cross at the EU averages. Energy intensity measured as energy consumption in kilograms of oil equivalent per thousand euro of GDP, in purchasing power standards terms. Share of renewables latest data are as of 2024.

Source: Eurostat/Our World in Data, Scope Ratings.



Note: Latest data for Ukraine are as of 2020; latest data for Georgia, Türkiye and Serbia are as of 2022.

Source: Eurostat, Scope Ratings.

5. Regional Views for 2026



5.1 Euro area CEE

| Sovereign | Long-term issuer rating and rating Outlook in foreign currency | What we are watching entering 2026 |
|-----------|--|---|
| Croatia | A-/Positive | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> After assigning a positive Outlook to Croatia this year, we anticipate continued strong economic momentum entering 2026, driven by private demand, wage increases, moderating inflation and public investment, supported by NGEU fund absorption. The reform momentum is strong, but the continued implementation of the National Recovery Plan is key to further strengthen Croatia's economic resilience and address the challenges related to moderate economic diversification and an adverse demographic outlook. The implementation of growth-enhancing fiscal measures led to some widening in the budget deficit. However, we foresee Croatia maintaining a prudent fiscal stance, resulting in gradually narrowing deficits and a stable debt trajectory at moderate levels. |
| Estonia | A+/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> After a prolonged period of stagnation, the Estonian economy is experiencing a gradual recovery driven by public investment, acceleration in the absorption of EU funds and a ramp-up in defence-related investments. Private demand should recover gradually, benefiting from favourable tax changes and improving funding conditions. The fiscal deficit is expected to widen markedly, remaining above historical averages over the forecast horizon, resulting in a steady rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio, but this should still remain among the lowest in the euro area. |
| Latvia | A-/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic momentum is gradually recovering after a prolonged period of weak growth. Investment growth is being driven primarily by the public sector and is expected to remain strong next year, as projects under the RRF near completion. Progress on other projects (including Rail Baltica and defence infrastructure) will sustain high levels of public investment in subsequent years. Private consumption should improve progressively, benefiting from solid wage growth and gradually normalising savings rates. Latvia's fiscal deficit is expected to remain above historical averages, leading to a steady increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Significant allocations to defence investments and social transfers will support high expenditure growth. We expect broad policy continuity following the upcoming legislative elections scheduled for H2 2026. |
| Lithuania | A+/ Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scope upgraded Lithuania in September to A+, owing to the country's strong growth performance, strengthened external resilience and sound fiscal fundamentals. Lithuania's economy is expected to continue outpacing neighbouring economies over the medium term. Consumption and investment are expected to remain key contributors to growth, supported by rising wages, lower borrowing costs, and recent policy changes affecting pension contributions. Investments should remain dynamic, supported by EU-funded projects and defence needs, while exports should continue to expand as service sectors remain resilient and goods exports benefit from gradually improving external demand. The fiscal position is set to weaken as spending rises more quickly than revenues, driven by higher social transfers, increased defence-related investment, and growing interest costs, resulting in a gradual widening of the deficit over coming years, which should nevertheless remain below the 3%-Maastricht threshold. |
| Slovakia | A/Negative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Following the revision of the outlook to Negative on Slovakia's A ratings in June this year, the country's export-oriented economy – dominated by the automotive sector – faced strong headwinds from higher US tariffs, global trade uncertainty, and slower growth among key European partners. Fiscal consolidation measures aimed at curbing deficits and debt have further weighed on activity, while continued absorption of EU funds and related investments will be crucial to partially offset these challenges. Government efforts to implement fiscal consolidation will continue in 2026 with the implementation of the third package of measures. Important factors to monitor include implementation challenges for budgetary consolidation amid subdued economic growth, rising spending pressures, the fragmented political environment and increasing risk of consolidation fatigue. |
| Slovenia | A+/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scope upgraded Slovenia in June to A+, reflecting an improved fiscal outlook, with public debt on a declining trajectory; sustained GDP growth and rising income, supported by reform momentum; and enhanced external resilience, underpinned by a stronger NIIP and continued current account surpluses, even under adverse global economic conditions. The general government deficit is projected to average 2.7% over 2025–2030, with public debt stabilising near 67% of GDP. A favourable debt profile and a strong cash buffer of EUR 9.5bn (13.5% of GDP) provide fiscal flexibility, while pension and wage-bill reforms aim to contain ageing-related pressures. Key challenges include persistent labour shortages and adverse demographics constraining potential growth and add to long-term fiscal pressures. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for March 2026. |

5.2 EU non-euro CEE

| Sovereign | Long-term issuer rating and rating Outlook in foreign currency | What we are watching entering 2026 |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| Bulgaria* | A-/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scope upgraded Bulgaria's ratings to A- in July 2025, given the significant credit-positive implications of the country's entry into the euro area (effective from January 2026). Euro accession will remove exchange-rate risk, increase monetary policy flexibility, improve access to euro-area capital markets and ECB facilities, and enhance financial stability while reducing financing costs for both the public and private sectors. Economic growth has been supported by strong consumption and rising investment, helped by increased use of EU funds. Over the medium term, growth is set to benefit from improving business confidence, continued EU fund absorption, and a recovery in exports, though import growth will remain high due to robust domestic demand and planned defence-related purchases. The fiscal position is projected to come under pressure as spending on social transfers, public wages, and defence outpaces revenue growth, keeping the deficit elevated despite efforts to strengthen tax collection. Sustained deficits will only be partly offset by high nominal growth, resulting in a steady increase in the public debt ratio. Importantly, the near-term policy outlook is affected by a degree of uncertainty, following a period of heightened social discontent which resulted in the suspension of the budgetary process and in the resignation of Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov. |
| Czech Republic | AA-/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The fiscal policy stance of the new government will be key for long-term debt sustainability amid budgetary pressures, including from rising military spending and adverse demographics. We will closely watch decisions on structural reforms, including possible adjustments to the recent pension reform. We will monitor the new coalition's ability to find consensus and implement reforms as well as the new government's positioning in the EU and NATO. Given Czechia's export dependence, especially exposure to the German economy and global supply chains, external sector developments remain a key risk factor in an environment of geopolitical tensions. |
| Hungary | BBB/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> We will monitor budgetary developments around recently upward-revised general government budget deficit targets of 5% of GDP for 2025 and 2026, with some risk of further slippage, including due to parliamentary elections in the spring of 2026. Relations with the EU will continue to be in focus in 2026 as the majority of EU funds remain suspended. Relatively sticky and high inflation, and the central bank's conservative monetary policy stance, are expected to continue weighing on economic growth. The economy's high reliance on Russian energy remains amid geopolitical tensions. |
| Poland | A/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key factors to watch in 2026 include i) the pace of fiscal consolidation, especially the projected improvement after the 2025 deficit peak and the ability to control structurally rigid expenditure components (wages, pensions, defence); ii) EU fund absorption, particularly the large remaining NGEU allocation due by 2026 and initial SAFE programme disbursements, which are crucial for investment and growth; iii) the debt trajectory relative to the constitutional ceiling, including whether pre-emptive measures are taken to avoid breaching the 60% national-definition debt limit later in the decade, and iv) political dynamics ahead of the 2027 elections, including risks of institutional frictions or delays in reforms that could affect fiscal policy credibility and EU-fund access. Poland benefits from solid macroeconomic fundamentals, with GDP growth projected at 3.5% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026, supported by resilient domestic demand, strong productivity trends and a diversified, increasingly high-value export base. A credible, rules-based fiscal framework, including a constitutional debt ceiling and automatic correction mechanisms, anchors medium-term fiscal discipline despite rising spending pressures. Poland maintains moderate but rising public debt, supported by deep domestic capital markets and favourable financing conditions. Debt is expected to increase toward 75% of GDP by 2030. Large EU funding inflows from NGEU (EUR 59.8bn by 2026) and the SAFE programme (EUR 44bn allocation), reinforce investment, fiscal resilience and external stability. |
| Romania | BBB-/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Romania's fiscal deficit reached 9.3% of GDP in 2024, the highest in the EU, and is projected to remain elevated despite gradual consolidation, narrowing to 6.2% of GDP by 2026. Authorities have presented an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan, including hikes to VAT rates and a freeze in public sector wages and pension payments. While political uncertainty has eased with the formation of a new coalition government, questions over its durability persist. Sustained policy continuity is essential to achieve multi-year fiscal adjustments and prevent further deterioration in public finances. Economic growth is expected to remain subdued over 2025-26, constrained by fiscal tightening. Delays in EU fund absorption could further weigh on growth and exacerbate fiscal and external vulnerabilities, making adherence to EU recovery plan milestones and fiscal targets critical for creditworthiness. |

*Set to join the euro area on Jan 1, 2026.

5.3 Emerging Markets

| Sovereign | Long-term issuer rating and rating Outlook in foreign currency | What we are watching entering 2026 |
|-----------|--|--|
| Georgia | BB/ Negative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The trajectory of Georgia's credit ratings will primarily depend on political and geopolitical tensions as well as the strength of domestic institutions. Relations with the European Union will remain a key driver given the risk of international sanctions and the importance of foreign financial inflows including foreign direct investment. External-sector risks have been exacerbated by a more volatile environment; the level of international reserves will remain a key focus area. Growth prospects have remained solid but could be weakened by political and geopolitical uncertainties. |
| Serbia | BB+/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key Factors to watch in 2026 include i) Serbia's budget performance, particularly the country's ability to maintain deficits below 3% of GDP while financing large EXPO-related investments without raising debt risks; ii) external-vulnerability trends, including the evolution of the current account deficit, FDI inflows and the impact of US sanctions on NIS on energy security, inflation and reserves; iii) progress on governance and EU-accession reforms, especially rule of law, media freedom, and commitments related to Kosovo, which remain conditions for deeper EU engagement and funding; and iv) exchange-rate and financial-stability conditions, given the high foreign-currency share of public debt and the sensitivity of external financing costs to global market conditions. Serbia benefits from a resilient macroeconomic performance, supported by a credible monetary-policy framework; moderate public debt (projected around 45% of GDP in 2025 and broadly stable thereafter), supported by prudent fiscal management, IMF-backed reforms and solid nominal growth despite large investment needs for EXPO 2027. External stability remains supported by sustained FDI, though structural vulnerabilities persist with a current account deficit above 5% of GDP and a negative NIIP (-60%), combined with high foreign-currency exposure in public and private debt. Institutional and political constraints, including slow progress on EU accession, governance gaps and tensions with Kosovo, continue to weigh on policy predictability and external-financing resilience. |
| Türkiye | BB-/Stable | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Türkiye's ratings are supported by disinflation, fiscal discipline and higher international reserves. The disinflation path and build-up of external buffers will remain central for the rating trajectory given the economy's high sensitivity to domestic and external developments and a track record of policy reversal. The evolution of financial stability risks will also be central given interlinkages with external and public finance risks. Maintaining fiscal discipline and reducing macroeconomic imbalances could also support the rating trajectory in the absence of shocks. |
| Ukraine | SD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ukraine's long-term ratings reflect the moratorium introduced by authorities in August 2024 on several external commercial claims. Negotiations with external commercial creditors, the evolution of gross financing needs approaching the end of the IMF programme set for March 2027 and associated financial assistance from international partners, potentially through Russian frozen assets, will remain key areas of focus. High uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the war will continue to cloud the outlook. |

6. Economic forecasts



6.1 Growth, inflation and official rates, 2023-2027F

| Country/region | Real GDP growth (annual average, %) | | | | | | | | Headline inflation ² (annual average, %) | | | | | | | Policy rates (end of period, %) | | | | |
|------------------------|--|-------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------|--|---------------|-------|---------------------|-------|-------|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | Diff. from | | Diff. from | | Medium- run potential | | | Diff. from | | Diff. from | | | End- 2023 | End- 2024 | End- 2025 | End- 2026 | End- 2027 | |
| | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | Jun-25 ¹ | 2026F | Jun-25 ¹ | | 2027F | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | Jun-25 ¹ | 2026F | | | | | | | Jun-25 ¹ |
| EU CEE-11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 1,7 | 3,2 | 3,3 | ↑ 0,7 | 3,2 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,8 | 2,75 | 9,5 | 2,4 | 4,6 | ↑ 1,0 | 4,0 | ↑ 2,3 | 2,6 | 3,75 | 3,04 | 1,8 | | |
| Croatia | 3,7 | 3,8 | 2,9 | ↑ 0,1 | 2,5 | ↓ 0,1 | 2,6 | 2,80 | 8,4 | 4,0 | 4,3 | ↑ 0,1 | 3,1 | ↑ 0,3 | 2,5 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Czech Republic | 0,2 | 1,1 | 2,3 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,2 | ↓ 0,2 | 2,3 | 2,25 | 10,7 | 2,4 | 2,5 | ↑ 0,1 | 2,0 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,3 | 6,75 | 4,0 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3,5 |
| Estonia | (2,8) | (0,1) | 0,6 | ↓ 0,7 | 2,3 | - | 2,0 | 2,20 | 9,1 | 3,7 | 4,9 | ↑ 0,3 | 3,6 | ↓ 0,9 | 2,6 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Hungary | (0,7) | 0,6 | 0,4 | ↓ 0,8 | 1,8 | ↓ 1,2 | 2,1 | 2,60 | 17,1 | 3,7 | 4,4 | ↓ 0,5 | 3,6 | ↓ 0,7 | 3,0 | 10,75 | 6,5 | 6,5 | 6,25 | 5,25 |
| Latvia | (1,1) | (0,3) | 1,7 | ↓ 0,3 | 2,2 | ↓ 0,3 | 1,8 | 2,25 | 9,1 | 1,3 | 3,9 | ↑ 0,5 | 2,9 | ↑ 0,6 | 2,5 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Lithuania | 0,8 | 3,0 | 2,4 | ↓ 0,4 | 3,1 | ↑ 0,1 | 2,6 | 2,50 | 8,7 | 0,9 | 3,4 | ↓ 0,5 | 2,8 | ↑ 0,4 | 2,6 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Poland | 0,1 | 3,0 | 3,4 | ↑ 0,3 | 3,0 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,9 | 3,00 | 11,4 | 3,8 | 3,9 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,5 | ↓ 1,0 | 2,5 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 4,25 | 3,75 | 3,75 |
| Romania | 2,3 | 0,9 | 1,3 | ↓ 0,1 | 0,7 | ↓ 1,6 | 1,6 | 3,50 | 10,4 | 5,6 | 7,3 | ↑ 2,4 | 7,1 | ↑ 3,4 | 3,9 | 7,0 | 6,5 | 6,5 | | |
| Slovakia | 2,1 | 1,9 | 0,8 | ↓ 0,7 | 1,2 | ↓ 0,5 | 1,5 | 2,25 | 11,0 | 3,2 | 4,2 | ↓ 0,8 | 4,0 | - | 3,3 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Slovenia | 2,6 | 1,7 | 0,9 | ↓ 0,9 | 2,1 | ↓ 0,1 | 1,8 | 2,50 | 7,2 | 2,0 | 2,5 | ↓ 0,3 | 2,0 | ↓ 0,2 | 2,1 | 4,0 | 3,0 | 2,0 | 2,0 | 1,75 |
| Non-EU emerging Europe | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Georgia | 7,8 | 9,4 | 7,2 | ↓ 0,3 | 5,7 | ↓ 0,8 | 5,5 | 5,00 | 2,5 | 1,1 | 3,9 | ↑ 0,1 | 3,3 | ↑ 0,2 | 2,9 | 9,5 | 8,0 | 8,0 | 7,5 | 7,5 |
| Serbia | 3,7 | 3,9 | 2,0 | ↓ 1,2 | 3,4 | ↓ 0,1 | 3,4 | 4,0 | 12,4 | 4,7 | 3,9 | ↓ 0,1 | 2,4 | ↓ 0,8 | 3,0 | 6,5 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,0 | 5,0 |
| Türkiye | 5,0 | 3,3 | 4,2 | ↑ 1,4 | 4,0 | ↑ 0,8 | 3,2 | 3,8 | 53,9 | 58,5 | 35,0 | ↓ 2,5 | 25,0 | ↑ 2,5 | 20,0 | 42,5 | 47,5 | 38,5 | 31,0 | 27,5 |
| Ukraine | 5,5 | 2,9 | 2,0 | ↓ 0,8 | 2,0 | ↓ 1,5 | 2,0 | 2,5 | 12,8 | 6,5 | 12,9 | ↓ 1,1 | 7,1 | ↓ 1,2 | 6,1 | 15,0 | 13,5 | 15,0 | 12,0 | 11,0 |

Negative values shown in parentheses.

Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

¹Changes compared with Scope [June-2025 Global Economic Outlook](#) forecasting.

²HICP headline inflation for euro-area member states; otherwise, CPI headline inflation.

6.2 Unemployment, fiscal metrics, 2023-2030F

| Country/region | Unemployment rate ³ (annual average, %) | | | | | Net government interest payments (annual avg, % of general gov't revenue) | | | | General government balance (annual average, % of GDP) | | | | | | General government debt level (end of period, % of GDP) | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|------|-------|-------|-------|--|-------|-------|-------|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026F | 2027F | 2025E | 2026F | 2027F | 2030F | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026F | 2027F | 2030F | 2023 | 2024 | 2025E | 2026F | 2027F | 2030F |
| EU CEE-11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 4,3 | 4,2 | 3,5 | 3,2 | 3,0 | 1,0 | 1,9 | 2,5 | 3,1 | (3,0) | (3,0) | (3,4) | (3,2) | (3,2) | (3,0) | 23 | 24 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 35 |
| Croatia | 6,0 | 5,1 | 4,8 | 4,7 | 4,6 | 2,3 | 2,3 | 2,5 | 2,5 | (0,8) | (1,9) | (2,9) | (2,8) | (2,5) | (1,8) | 61 | 57 | 57 | 56 | 56 | 56 |
| Czech Republic | 2,6 | 2,8 | 2,9 | 2,8 | 2,7 | 1,7 | 1,8 | 1,9 | 1,8 | (3,7) | (2,0) | (2,3) | (2,7) | (2,8) | (2,9) | 42 | 43 | 44 | 46 | 47 | 50 |
| Estonia | 6,5 | 7,6 | 7,8 | 7,4 | 7,2 | 0,4 | 0,6 | 0,9 | 1,2 | (2,7) | (1,7) | (1,3) | (3,8) | (3,8) | (2,8) | 20 | 24 | 24 | 27 | 30 | 35 |
| Hungary | 4,1 | 4,4 | 4,4 | 4,3 | 4,3 | 9,3 | 9,9 | 10,2 | 10,3 | (6,8) | (5,0) | (5,1) | (5,0) | (4,8) | (4,3) | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 77 |
| Latvia | 6,5 | 6,9 | 6,7 | 6,1 | 5,9 | 2,6 | 3,2 | 3,6 | 3,8 | (2,4) | (1,8) | (3,0) | (3,2) | (3,7) | (3,1) | 44 | 47 | 46 | 47 | 49 | 52 |
| Lithuania | 6,8 | 7,1 | 6,9 | 7,0 | 7,0 | 2,4 | 2,5 | 3,0 | 3,4 | (0,7) | (1,3) | (2,5) | (2,8) | (2,9) | (2,5) | 37 | 38 | 42 | 44 | 46 | 49 |
| Poland | 2,8 | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,2 | 3,2 | 5,7 | 5,7 | 6,1 | 6,0 | (5,2) | (6,5) | (6,9) | (6,5) | (6,3) | (4,5) | 50 | 55 | 60 | 65 | 69 | 74 |
| Romania | 5,6 | 5,5 | 5,9 | 6,4 | 6,6 | 8,1 | 7,1 | 8,0 | 8,8 | (5,6) | (9,3) | (8,1) | (6,3) | (5,6) | (4,6) | 52 | 55 | 59 | 61 | 63 | 67 |
| Slovakia | 5,8 | 5,4 | 5,4 | 5,7 | 5,9 | 2,5 | 3,1 | 3,6 | 4,4 | (5,3) | (5,5) | (5,1) | (4,3) | (4,5) | (3,4) | 56 | 59 | 61 | 64 | 66 | 70 |
| Slovenia | 3,6 | 3,7 | 3,3 | 2,9 | 2,8 | 2,0 | 2,4 | 2,6 | 3,1 | (2,6) | (0,9) | (2,6) | (2,9) | (2,8) | (2,6) | 68 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 |
| Non-EU emerging Europe | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Georgia | 16,4 | 13,9 | 14,0 | 13,5 | 13,5 | 6,6 | 6,3 | 6,2 | 5,6 | (2,3) | (2,3) | (2,2) | (2,4) | (2,1) | (2,0) | 39 | 36 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 35 |
| Serbia | 9,4 | 8,6 | 8,8 | 8,4 | 8,0 | 5,3 | 5,2 | 5,0 | 4,7 | (1,2) | (1,8) | (3,0) | (2,8) | (2,8) | (1,9) | 46 | 44 | 45 | 45 | 46 | 44 |
| Türkiye ⁴ | 9,4 | 8,7 | 8,4 | 8,4 | 8,7 | 9,7 | 10,2 | 11,7 | 9,4 | (5,1) | (4,7) | (3,6) | (3,6) | (3,7) | (2,9) | 29 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 25 | 24 |
| Ukraine ⁴ | | | | | | 11,4 | 10,8 | 10,2 | 9,8 | (20,4) | (17,6) | (19,3) | (15,9) | (11,7) | (7,5) | 84 | 91 | 99 | 105 | 109 | 106 |

Negative values shown in parentheses.

Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

⁴ Unemployment rate data source is Eurostat for EU member states; national unemployment series otherwise.

⁵ Türkiye and Ukraine fiscal-balance figures are for the central-government budget balance.

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