

## Global Economic Outlook 2026





## Contents

- → Global Economic Outlook 2026
- → Annex

#### **Global Economic Outlook 2026**

#### **Core themes:**

- 1) A resilient global economy but risks for the durability of the cycle are rising;
- 2) Markets remain sensitive to anticipated corrections given lofty valuations as financial-system risks persist;
- 3) Ongoing trading tensions, sovereign debt concerns alongside geopolitical conflicts weigh on the outlook;
- 4) Inflation remains elevated globally; risks for the 2% inflation target are now more balanced for the euro area;
- 5) Higher rates for longer: More elevated official and long-term financing rates compared with the pre-pandemic levels; and
- 6) Tight labour markets, although there has been some weakening in the UK and the United States.

Global macro and credit risks tilted to the downside (see <u>slide 22</u> and <u>slide 23</u>) over the medium run, considering: (i) Increased financial-market and financial-stability vulnerabilities; (ii) Potential re-escalation of trading tensions – even if the US Supreme Court were to rule unconstitutional many of the US tariffs adopted this year; (iii) Rising sovereign debt risks from fiscal pressures; and (iv) Elevated geopolitical risk. The medium-term macro outlook represents a challenge for the global credit outlook.

**Euro area growth remains moderate**. The strength in peripheral-European economies has offset recent weaknesses in Germany and France. Euro area-21 growth forecast at 1.4% next year before 1.3% in 2027 – the same as the bloc's 1.3% potential rate of growth. Stronger 2026 German growth to offset the slightly slower growth next year within several euro area periphery economies. Higher defence spending, investment programmes and recent monetary easing support activity.

**Financial-market developments**. US and global yields remain elevated. Credit spreads have narrowed significantly but are under-pricing longer-run risks. French sovereign spreads remain elevated although French spread movements have remained comparatively idiosyncratic at this stage. Global equities remain at or near their all-time highs – underscoring concerns surrounding valuations.

#### The themes for the global outlook

A resilient global economy but increasing risks for the global expansion. A negative global macro and credit outlook.



Resilient economy but increasing risks for the global recovery



Corrections anticipated in rising markets amid lofty valuations and financial-system risks



Tariff, sovereign debt and geopolitical risks



Borrowing rates remain above the prepandemic rates



Tight labour markets although select labour markets are softening



Inflation for longer although euro area risks more balanced

#### Trade policy to stay volatile as the US President responds to legal challenges

Escalation and de-escalation cycles persist with the forthcoming announcement of the US Supreme Court on >80% of the US tariffs adopted in 2025.

'Liberation day' tariff announcements on 2 April 2025; their partial and temporary suspension on 9 April 2025.

28 May 2025: US court rules Donald Trump overstepped his authority using a 1977 act to justify many of the country tariffs. 1 November 2025: The US reaches a one-year framework agreement with China, including cutting fentanyl-related US tariffs by 10pps, postponing tariff rises, and lifting varying export controls, import embargoes and fines.

Late 2025 to 1H 2026: If the use of IEEPA to pass many of the country tariffs is ruled as unconstitutional, the Trump government to act quickly to replace tariffs and recent agreements.

**8 May 2025**: The UK and the US reach agreement reducing specific sectoral tariffs on imports from the UK.

**12 May**: US reduces to 10% cumulative tariffs adopted on certain Chinese imports for 90 days.

China cuts to 10% levy rates on the US from 125%.


August 2025: An agreement reached between the United States and the EU for US tariffs on the EU of 15%, with the EU slashing tariffs on the US to <1% and pledging >USD 1trn of investment into the US economy.

Between late 2025 and January 2026: The US Supreme Court announces its decision on the use of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) by the government for justifying most of the tariffs this year.

### EU economy remains resilient even as US tariffs hit multi-decade highs

EU growth remains resilient despite the sharp rise in US tariffs on the EU (by around 16pps in aggregate this year).


## Cumulative impact on euro area output including 15% levy on EU exports, percentage points



NB: This scenario for the effects of US levies on the EU is based on the measures already in force or announced by the US since the start of the second Trump administration and the countermeasures of trading partners, including the agreements announced between the US and its trading partners such as the 15% rate on EU exports to the United States.

Source: Scope Ratings.

## **United States average tariff rate on all imports**, percentage points



Historical average tariff rates are from the Tax Foundation. The 2025 current effective tariff rate is based on the Yale Budget Lab estimate assuming the tariffs as of 17 November 2025. Weighted averages for advanced and emerging economies are based on Scope estimates. Average tariff rate estimates for 2025 are on pre-substitution bases not accounting for consumption shifts. Source: Tax Foundation, The Budget Lab at Yale University, Scope Ratings.

#### US budgetary sustainability has become an increasing market concern

The fiscal sustainability of the United States has become an increasing risk factor.

20 January 2025:

Trump is re-inaugurated, becoming the 47<sup>th</sup>
President of the United
States.

14 March 2025: Congress sidesteps a government shutdown by passing a continuing resolution funding the US government for the rest of fiscal 2025 (through 30 September 2025).

22 May 2025: The House of Representatives passes the "One Big Beautiful Bill", centring around an extension of the 2017 tax cuts. The President signed an amended Bill into force on 4 July 2025. The Penn Wharton Budget Model found the Bill may raise primary budget deficits by around USD 3.3trn over 10 years.

3 November 2026: Midterm elections, during which the Republican Party must defend Senate and House of Representatives majorities.

The first one hundred days: At least 121,000 federal workers were laid off or targeted for layoff by the short-lived Department of Government Efficiency and thousands more accepted buy-out offers.


16 May 2025: Moody's downgrades the United States to Aa1 – removing the United States' final triple-A credit rating from the Big-3 credit rating agencies.

1 October to 12
November 2025: The
US government sees a
record 43-day
shutdown following
failure to reach an
agreement around the
extension of health-care
subsidies.

**24 October**: Scope downgrades the United States to AA- from AA.


## The US elections and the response in the capital markets


Snapshot.



### Credit spreads have fallen sharply but may under-price medium-run risks

Credit spreads have moderated from the recent highs.






## **Yield curves steepened**

Although US\$ bonds have rallied.






Source: Macrobond.


## **Equity valuations elevated**

US equity valuations near their record highs.




#### The relevance of non-bank financial institutions affects systemic risk

The less-regulated non-bank financial intermediation sector is increasingly relevant globally and regionally.



### Sovereign yields remain high with wider French spreads and the periphery narrowing

Longer-term yields remain elevated within the euro area and globally, with French spreads remaining higher as France advances its 2026 Budget.




## 10-year yield spreads to German Bunds, bps Portugal Spain France 200 As of 5 December 2025. Source: Macrobond, Scope Ratings. **Relevant dates (France)** 31 December 2025 Deadline for the approval of the 2026 Budget by Parliament March 2026 Local elections By end-April 2026 Submission of the latest medium-term fiscal structural plan 1H 2027 Presidential elections


Source: Scope Ratings.

Macroeconomic Council: Financial Conditions

#### US data have partially rebounded whereas euro area data have slowly recovered


The data remain consistent with resilient global growth this year. Gradual recovery in the euro area data.






## The global economy remains resilient but risks for the durability of the cycle are rising

Our non-consensus baseline has correctly been for the soft landing of the <u>global</u> economy since 2022 against the repeated consensus of US and/or global recession during the years. Nevertheless – we are at a mid- or later-stage of the economic cycle.



# German growth set to firm next year on higher defence spending and investment; periphery continues outperforming

The strengthening of German growth ought to support moderate 2026 euro area growth – after the periphery has driven euro area growth during the recent years.




## Labour markets remain tight, but have softened within specific economies

The labour market is tight by historical standards with euro area unemployment remaining at or near its record lows. But the labour market has softened recently within the UK and the US.

#### **Unemployment rate**

%, 2023-2027F




### Divergent fiscal positions and perceived security threats drive spending priorities

Germany to increase its defence expenditures while other EU member states face tighter fiscal space; 3.5% of GDP military spending targets by 2035. Sovereigns whose budgetary pressure from interest spending will be near or above long-term highs include the US, HU, CN, FR, JP, FI.

#### Change in primary fiscal balance (2030F vs 2024)

General government primary balances, % of GDP




Source: IMF, Scope Ratings forecasts.

Note: Euro area (EA) members are shown in blue, non-EA EU members are shown in shaded-blue, rest of the globe is shown in red. Dot sizes reflect the projected general government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2030, in relative terms.

#### **Net general government interest payments**

% of general government revenues




Note: Post-2000 peak value for Türkiye amounted to 50.2%.

Sovereign Rating Group: Sovereign Outlook 2026 18


## Public debt dynamics through 2030


Significant reduction in public debt ratios anticipated in recently upgraded sovereigns (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus). Continuous fiscal pressures in Austria, Finland, the United Kingdom, France, US, Belgium, China.



#### Inflation expected to stay a problem


Inflation expected to remain above 2% across many economies such as the United States, the UK and Japan. But inflation risks of the euro area have become more balanced.





#### The long-standing expectation of higher steady-state rates

Fed intermittently easing under market and political pressure; ECB momentarily on hold. BoE gradually easing; BoJ slowly tightening. We have assumed since 2022 higher steady-state borrowing rates globally for longer. Official rates to rest above their pre-crisis levels even following rate reduction cycles. The elevated inflation expectations ensure long-term yields staying higher for longer.



Dashed lines on the graphic in years 2025, 2026 and 2027 designate Scope forecasting for year-ends 2025, 2026 and 2027. The federal funds rate represents the mid-point of the Federal Reserve's target range. Source: central banks, Scope Ratings forecasts.

#### **Negative macro risk outlook**

Negative tilt of global macro and credit risks.

Upside potential for economic expectations represents:


- global expansionary budgetary policies anchoring domestic spending and central-bank easing supporting market sentiment;
- resilient private demand as wages rise and labour markets stay strong;
- structural reforms, investment and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) paying further economic dividends; and/or
- the reversal or easing of US trade policies because of judicial interventions and/or further trading agreements being reached.

These are outweighed by meaningful downside risks, considering the possibility of:

• more meaningful re-pricings in financial markets, further rises in borrowing rates and/or financial-system risks – given elevated valuations, risks in AI, the non-bank financial intermediation sector and private credit, US and global financial deregulation, sustained inflation, and challenges for central-bank independence;


22

- the **escalation of the trade war**, de-globalisation and how this may provoke economic slowdown;
- government budgetary challenges triggering market re-appraisal of sovereign risks; and/or
- **geopolitical risks** re-intensifying affecting commodity prices and global value chains.





#### Scope credit outlooks by sector



Macroeconomic Council: Credit Ratings

23



## Contents

- → Global Economic Outlook 2026
- $\rightarrow \textbf{Annex}$

## **Annex – Macroeconomic Outlook – December 2025**

#### Economic overview

GDP Growth	Inflation	Unemployment		Official F	Rates	Exchange Rates	
Resilient global economy but increasing risks for the cycle	Global inflation remaining sticky around or somewhat above 2%	Labour markets remaining tight, although recent softening within the UK and the US		fficial rates a t remain abo pandemic	ove the p		The euro has appreciated as the dollar has lost ground
<b>2026 / 2027 (annual avgs)</b> <b>1.4% / 1.3%</b> Euro area-21	2026 / 2027 (annual avgs)	2026 / 2027 (annual avgs) 6.3% / 6.3% Euro area-21	2025	Fed 3.5-3.75%	<b>BoE</b> 3.75%	ECB 2.0%	2024 / 2025 YTD (% change in nominal
<b>1.0% / 1.0%</b> UK	<b>2.2% / 1.9%</b> Euro area-21 <b>2.7% / 2.3%</b> UK	5.1% / 5.2% UK	(EOP)	3.3-3.7376	3.7370	2.0 /6	effective exchange rates)
<b>2.4% / 1.75%</b> US <b>3.2% / 3.1%</b> Global growth	<b>2.9% / 2.4%</b> US	<b>4.2% / 4.3%</b> US	2026 (EOP)	3.0- 3.25%	3.5%	2.0%	-1.1% / 6.0% Euro 3.8% / -0.7% Sterling
			2027 (EOP)	2.75-3%	3.25%	1.75%	<b>7.8% / -6.4%</b> Dollar

Upside risks	Downside risks
Expansionary budgetary policies and monetary easing 🗸	× Financial-market re-pricing and financial instability
The resilience of private demand 🗸	× Trade conflicts and de-globalisation
Structural reforms, investment and Al 🗸	× The market re-appraisal of sovereign debt risks
The reversal or easing of US trade policies 🗸	× Geo-politics

# Annex – Global economic outlook (December 2025) – growth, inflation and official rates, euro area, 2023-2027F

				Real GD (annual av	P growth rerage, %)							eadline inflati nual average		Policy rates (end of period, %)							
Country/region	2023	2024	2025E	Diff. from	2026F	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2027F	Medium- run potential	2023	2024	2025E	Diff. from	2026F	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2027F	End-2023	End-2024	End-2025	End-2026	End-2027	
EU-27	0.5	1.0	1.5	n/a	1.4	n/a	1.4	1.4	6.4	2.6	2.4	n/a	2.4	n/a	2.1						
Euro area-21 <sup>3</sup>	0.6	1.0	1.5	n/a	1.4	n/a	1.3	1.3	5.5	2.4	2.1	n/a	2.2	n/a	1.9	4.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.75	
Germany	(0.7)	(0.5)	0.3	↑ 0.3	1.0	↓ 0.2	1.2	0.8	6.0	2.5	2.3	-	2.5	↑ 0.7	2.0						
France	1.6	1.1	0.9	↑ 0.2	1.0	↓ 0.1	0.8	1.1	5.7	2.3	0.9	↑ 0.1	1.3	↓ 0.2	1.5						
Italy	1.1	0.5	0.6	-	0.7	↓ 0.1	0.9	0.9	5.9	1.1	1.7	↓ 0.2	1.4	↓ 0.2	1.8						
Spain	2.5	3.5	2.9	↑ 0.4	2.5	↑ 0.7	2.1	1.75	3.4	2.9	2.7	↑ 0.4	2.9	↑ 1.0	2.1						
Netherlands	(0.6)	1.1	1.7	↑ 0.2	1.4	↑ 0.0	1.0	1.2	4.1	3.2	3.0	↓ 0.1	3.1	↑ 0.3	1.9						
Belgium	1.7	1.1	1.0	-	1.0	↓ 0.1	1.0	1.3	2.3	4.3	3.1	↑ 0.4	2.4	↑ 0.5	2.1						
Austria	(0.7)	(8.0)	0.6	↑ 0.7	0.9	↓ 0.4	1.0	1.0	7.7	2.9	3.6	↑ 0.2	2.9	↑ 0.9	2.0						
Ireland	(2.6)	2.6	13.0	↑ 8.0	3.0	↓ 1.0	2.5	3.2	5.2	1.3	2.1	↑ 0.2	2.6	↑ 0.6	1.8						
Finland	(0.9)	0.4	0.2	↓ 0.7	1.0	↓ 0.6	1.0	1.2	4.3	1.0	1.8	↓ 0.2	1.3	↓ 0.9	1.7						
Portugal	3.1	2.1	1.9	↓ 0.2	2.1	↑ 0.2	1.7	1.9	5.3	2.7	2.2	↓ 0.1	1.8	↓ 0.2	2.0						
Greece	2.1	2.1	2.0	↓ 0.1	2.0	↑ 0.2	1.7	1.25	4.2	3.0	2.9	↓ 0.2	2.2	↓ 0.3	2.1						
Slovakia	2.1	1.9	0.8	↓ 0.7	1.2	↓ 0.5	1.5	2.25	11.0	3.2	4.2	↓ 0.8	3.9	↓ 0.1	3.3						
Luxembourg	0.1	0.3	0.5	↓ 1.7	2.3	↓ 0.1	2.0	2.2	2.9	2.3	2.5	↑ 0.3	2.4	↑ 0.3	1.9						
Lithuania	0.8	3.0	2.4	↓ 0.4	3.1	↑ 0.1	2.6	2.5	8.7	0.9	3.4	↓ 0.5	3.2	↑ 0.8	2.6						
Slovenia	2.6	1.7	0.9	↓ 0.9	2.1	↓ 0.1	1.8	2.5	7.2	2.0	2.4	↓ 0.4	2.6	↑ 0.4	2.6						
Latvia	(1.1)	(0.3)	1.7	↓ 0.3	2.2	↓ 0.3	1.8	2.25	9.1	1.3	3.8	↑ 0.4	2.7	↑ 0.4	2.5						
Estonia	(2.8)	(0.1)	0.6	↓ 0.7	2.3	-	2.0	2.2	9.1	3.7	4.9	↑ 0.3	3.4	↓ 1.1	2.7						
Cyprus	3.6	3.9	3.5	↑ 0.8	3.1	↑ 0.3	2.4	3.0	3.9	2.3	8.0	↓ 1.0	1.4	↓ 0.3	2.0						
Malta	10.6	7.0	3.1	↓ 0.8	3.2	↓ 0.7	3.3	3.75	5.6	2.4	2.4	↑ 0.3	1.8	↓ 0.2	1.8						
Croatia	3.7	3.8	2.9	↑ 0.1	2.5	↓ 0.1	2.6	2.8	8.4	4.0	4.4	↑ 0.2	3.5	↑ 0.7	2.6						
Bulgaria	1.7	3.2	3.2	↑ 0.6	3.2	↑ 0.2	2.8	2.75	9.5	2.4	4.6	↑ 1.0	4.0	↑ 2.3	2.6	3.75	3.04	1.81		000000000000000000000000000000000000000	

Negative values shown in parentheses. Presented for the 38 economies for which Scope publicly rates the sovereigns. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

<sup>1.</sup> Changes compared with Scope June-2025 mid-year Economic Outlook forecasts.

<sup>2.</sup> HICP headline inflation for euro area-20 member states; CPI headline inflation for Bulgaria.

<sup>3.</sup> Displayed is the euro area-21, reflecting the accession of Bulgaria from January 2026. Shown for the euro area policy rate is the ECB deposit facility rate.

# Annex – Global economic outlook (December 2025) – growth, inflation and official rates, beyond the euro area, 2023-2027F

				Real GDI (annual av								eadline inflati inual average				Policy rates (end of period, %)						
Country/region	2023	2024	2025E	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2026F	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2027F	Medium- run potential	2023	2024	2025E	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2026F	Diff. from Jun-25 <sup>1</sup>	2027F	End-2023	End-2024	End-2025	End-2026	End-2027		
Western Europe ex-euro are	ea																					
United Kingdom	0.3	1.1	1.4	↑ 0.4	1.0	↓ 0.3	1.0	1.5	7.3	2.5	3.4	↑ 0.1	2.7	-	2.3	5.25	4.75	3.75	3.5	3.25		
Switzerland	0.9	1.4	1.0	↑ 0.1	1.3	↓ 0.5	1.2	1.5	2.1	1.1	0.2	↓ 0.1	0.2	↓ 0.4	0.7	1.75	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Sweden	0.0	0.9	1.9	↑ 0.1	2.5	↑ 0.1	2.1	1.8	8.5	2.8	8.0	↓ 1.7	1.0	↓ 0.8	2.0	4.0	2.5	1.75	1.75	1.75		
Norway	0.2	2.1	1.6	↓ 0.4	1.4	↑ 0.1	1.5	1.8	5.5	3.1	3.1	-	2.7	↓ 0.1	2.2	4.5	4.5	4.0	3.75	3.5		
Denmark	0.6	3.5	2.5	↓ 0.7	2.3	↑ 0.3	1.7	1.5	3.3	1.4	1.9	↑ 0.2	2.0	↑ 0.5	1.7	3.6	2.6	1.6	1.6	1.35		
EU central and eastern Euro	pe ex-euro a	rea																***************************************				
Poland	0.1	3.0	3.4	↑ 0.3	3.0	↑ 0.2	2.9	3.0	11.4	3.8	3.9	↑ 0.2	2.5	↓ 1.0	2.5	5.75	5.75	4.0	3.75	3.75		
Romania	2.3	0.9	1.3	↓ 0.1	0.7	↓ 1.6	1.6	3.5	10.4	5.6	7.3	↑ 2.4	7.1	↑ 3.4	3.9	7.0	6.5	6.5	5.5	4.5		
Czech Republic	0.2	1.1	2.3	↑ 0.2	2.2	↓ 0.2	2.3	2.25	10.7	2.4	2.5	↑ 0.1	1.8	-	2.3	6.75	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5		
Hungary	(0.7)	0.6	0.4	↓ 0.8	1.8	↓ 1.2	2.1	2.6	17.1	3.7	4.4	↓ 0.5	3.6	↓ 0.7	3.0	10.75	6.5	6.5	6.25	5.25		
Non-EU emerging Europe																						
Türkiye	5.0	3.3	4.2	↑ 1.4	4.0	↑ 0.8	3.2	3.8	53.9	58.5	35.0	↓ 2.5	25.0	↑ 2.5	20.0	42.5	47.5	38.5	31.0	27.5		
Ukraine	5.5	2.9	2.0	↓ 0.8	2.0	↓ 1.5	2.0	2.5	12.8	6.5	12.9	↓ 1.1	7.1	↓ 1.2	6.1	15.0	13.5	15.5	12.0	11.0		
Serbia	3.7	3.9	2.0	↓ 1.2	3.4	↓ 0.1	3.4	4.0	12.4	4.7	3.9	↓ 0.1	2.4	↓ 0.8	3.0	6.5	5.75	5.75	5.0	5.0		
Georgia	7.8	9.4	7.2	↓ 0.3	5.7	↓ 0.8	5.5	5.0	2.5	1.1	3.9	↑ 0.1	3.4	↑ 0.3	2.9	9.5	8.0	8.0	7.5	7.5		
Rest of World (Advanced)																						
United States	2.9	2.8	2.1	↑ 0.3	2.4	↑ 0.6	1.75	2.0	4.1	2.9	2.8	-	2.9	↑ 0.2	2.4	5.25-5.5	4.25-4.5	3.5-3.75	3-3.25	2.75-3		
China⁴	5.2	5.0	5.0	↑ 0.2	4.7	↑ 0.2	4.5	4.2	0.3	0.2	(0.2)	-	0.9	↓ 0.1	1.4	3.45	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.8		
Japan <sup>5</sup>	1.2	-0.2	1.3	↑ 0.6	0.7	↓ 0.2	0.7	0.4	3.2	2.7	3.2	↓ 0.3	2.6	↑ 0.1	2.5	(0.1)	0.25	0.75	1.0	1.0		
Africa														-								
South Africa	0.8	0.5	1.3	↑ 0.6	1.2	↓ 0.1	1.2	1.5	6.1	4.4	3.3	↑ 0.1	3.3	↓ 0.4	3.0	8.25	7.75	6.75	6.25	6.0		
World	3.5	3.3	3.3	↑ 0.3	3.2	↑ 0.1	3.1	2.7	6.7	5.8	4.2	↓ 0.1	3.9	↑ 0.1	3.5							

Negative values shown in parentheses. Presented for the 38 economies for which Scope publicly rates the sovereigns. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

<sup>1.</sup> Changes compared with Scope June-2025 mid-year Economic Outlook forecasts.

<sup>2.</sup> Displayed is CPI headline inflation.

<sup>4.</sup> Shown for China's policy rate is the one-year bank prime loan rate.

<sup>5.</sup> Shown for Japan's policy rate is the deposit rate on current account balances.

# Annex – Global economic outlook (December 2025) – unemployment and fiscal metrics, euro area, 2023-30F

Country/region			ployment ra al average,			Net government interest payments (annual avg, % of general gov't revenue)							ment balan je, % of GDF			General government debt level (end of period, % of GDP)							
	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F		
EU-27	6.1	6.0	6.1	6.0	6.0	3.8	4.0	4.4	5.0	(3.4)	(3.1)	(3.3)	(3.4)	(3.3)	(3.2)	81	81	81	82	83	84		
Euro area-21 <sup>7</sup>	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.3	3.8	4.1	4.4	5.2	(3.5)	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	88	88	88	89	89	90		
Germany	3.1	3.4	3.8	3.7	3.7	2.0	2.2	2.4	3.0	(2.5)	(2.7)	(2.6)	(3.4)	(3.5)	(4.0)	62	62	63	65	66	71		
France	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.7	7.8	3.9	4.5	5.2	6.9	(5.4)	(5.8)	(5.4)	(5.3)	(5.2)	(4.9)	110	113	116	119	121	125		
Italy	7.7	6.6	6.2	6.1	5.9	8.3	8.5	8.6	9.2	(7.2)	(3.4)	(3.0)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(2.5)	134	135	136	138	137	136		
Spain	12.2	11.4	10.6	10.0	9.6	5.4	6.1	6.3	6.4	(3.3)	(3.2)	(2.5)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(2.3)	105	102	100	98	96	92		
Netherlands	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.2	1.1	1.4	1.6	2.1	(0.4)	(0.9)	(2.1)	(2.9)	(2.6)	(3.0)	46	43	43	44	45	50		
Belgium	5.5	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.1	3.7	4.2	4.7	6.3	(4.0)	(4.4)	(5.4)	(5.2)	(5.1)	(5.7)	102	104	107	109	112	120		
Austria	5.1	5.2	5.7	5.9	6.2	2.4	2.5	3.1	3.9	(2.6)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(4.2)	(3.7)	(3.6)	78	80	81	83	83	84		
Ireland	4.3	4.3	4.8	5.0	5.3	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.0	1.4	4.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	42	38	32	30	29	27		
Finland	7.2	8.4	9.7	10.0	10.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.3	(2.9)	(4.4)	(4.5)	(3.8)	(3.6)	(3.3)	77	83	87	89	90	94		
Portugal	6.6	6.5	6.1	5.7	5.5	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.4	1.3	0.5	0.2	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.9)	97	94	90	88	85	78		
Greece	11.1	10.1	8.9	8.3	7.9	6.7	6.5	6.7	6.3	(1.4)	1.2	0.5	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.6)	164	154	145	139	134	122		
Slovakia	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.7	5.9	2.5	3.1	3.6	4.4	(5.3)	(5.5)	(5.1)	(4.3)	(4.5)	(3.4)	56	59	61	64	66	70		
Luxembourg	5.2	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.6	(0.3)	0.0	0.2	0.7	(0.7)	0.9	(0.8)	(8.0)	(1.0)	(1.5)	25	26	27	27	27	27		
Lithuania	6.8	7.1	6.9	7.0	7.0	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.4	(0.7)	(1.3)	(2.5)	(2.8)	(2.9)	(2.5)	37	38	42	44	46	49		
Slovenia	3.6	3.7	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.0	2.4	2.6	3.1	(2.6)	(0.9)	(2.6)	(2.9)	(2.8)	(2.6)	68	67	67	67	67	67		
Latvia	6.5	6.9	6.7	6.1	5.9	2.6	3.2	3.6	3.8	(2.4)	(1.8)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(3.7)	(3.1)	44	47	46	47	49	52		
Estonia	6.5	7.6	7.8	7.4	7.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2	(2.7)	(1.7)	(1.3)	(3.8)	(3.8)	(2.8)	20	24	24	27	30	35		
Cyprus	5.9	4.9	4.8	4.7	5.1	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.9	1.7	4.1	3.7	3.3	2.6	1.1	71	63	55	51	47	38		
Malta	3.5	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.3	(4.4)	(3.5)	(3.2)	(3.0)	(2.6)	(2.5)	47	46	47	48	48	48		
Croatia	6.0	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.6	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.5	(8.0)	(1.9)	(2.9)	(2.8)	(2.5)	(1.8)	61	57	57	56	56	56		
Bulgaria	4.3	4.2	3.6	3.2	3.0	1.0	1.9	2.6	3.1	(3.0)	(3.0)	(3.4)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.0)	23	24	28	30	31	35		

Negative values shown in parentheses. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

<sup>6.</sup> Unemployment rate data source is Eurostat for EU member states.

<sup>7.</sup> Displayed is the euro area-21, reflecting the accession of Bulgaria from January 2026. Scope calculations are displayed for historical values of euro area-21 unemployment and net government interest payments.

# Annex – Global economic outlook (December 2025) – unemployment and fiscal metrics, beyond the euro area, 2023-30F

Country/region			ployment ra al average,				vernment ir avg, % of ge			General government balance (annual average, % of GDP)							General government debt level (end of period, % of GDP)						
	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F	2023	2024	2025E	2026F	2027F	2030F		
Western Europe ex-euro are	а																						
United Kingdom	4.2	4.4	4.9	5.1	5.2	6.4	6.6	7.0	8.0	(6.1)	(5.7)	(5.1)	(4.8)	(4.8)	(4.5)	100	101	103	106	109	114		
Switzerland	2.0	2.4	2.8	3.3	2.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1	39	38	37	36	35	32		
Sweden	7.7	8.4	8.9	9.1	9.1	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.0	(0.9)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(2.5)	(1.9)	(0.5)	32	34	35	36	38	37		
Norway	3.6	4.0	4.6	4.9	5.3	(4.9)	(4.3)	(3.8)	(2.7)	16.5	13.1	12.5	11.2	10.4	8.6	44	43	43	42	41	39		
Denmark	5.1	6.2	6.3	5.9	5.7	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.4)	3.4	4.5	2.0	1.3	1.1	(0.4)	33	31	28	27	26	26		
EU central and eastern Euro	pe ex-euro are	ea																					
Poland	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.2	5.7	5.7	6.1	6.0	(5.2)	(6.5)	(6.9)	(6.5)	(6.3)	(4.5)	50	55	60	65	69	74		
Romania	5.6	5.5	6.0	6.4	6.5	8.1	7.1	8.0	8.8	(5.6)	(9.3)	(8.1)	(6.3)	(5.6)	(4.6)	52	55	59	61	63	67		
Czech Republic	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	(3.7)	(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(2.9)	42	43	44	46	47	50		
Hungary	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	9.3	9.9	10.2	10.3	(6.8)	(5.0)	(5.1)	(5.0)	(4.8)	(4.3)	73	74	75	76	77	77		
Non-EU emerging Europe																							
Türkiye <sup>8</sup>	9.4	8.7	8.4	8.4	8.7	9.7	10.2	11.7	9.4	(5.1)	(4.7)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(3.6)	(2.8)	29	24	24	25	25	24		
Ukraine <sup>8</sup>						11.4	10.8	10.2	9.8	(20.4)	(17.6)	(19.3)	(15.9)	(11.7)	(7.5)	84	91	99	105	109	106		
Serbia	9.4	8.6	8.8	8.4	8.0	5.3	5.2	5.0	4.7	(1.2)	(1.8)	(3.0)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(1.9)	46	44	45	45	46	44		
Georgia	16.4	13.9	14.0	13.5	13.5	6.6	6.3	6.2	5.6	(2.3)	(2.3)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.1)	(2.0)	39	36	34	33	33	35		
Rest of World (Advanced)																							
United States	3.6	4.0	4.3	4.2	4.3	11.7	12.5	12.6	13.2	(7.8)	(8.0)	(7.4)	(7.8)	(7.9)	(7.5)	120	122	125	127	130	140		
China <sup>9</sup>	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.2	4.9	5.6	6.2	7.7	(6.7)	(7.3)	(8.6)	(8.6)	(8.5)	(8.2)	82	88	96	103	108	121		
Japan	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	1.1	2.0	3.1	6.0	(2.3)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(3.1)	(3.7)	(5.2)	240	236	229	226	224	225		
Africa																							
South Africa	32.4	32.6	32.5	33.0	33.0	19.7	20.2	20.3	20.1	(5.5)	(5.8)	(5.7)	(5.7)	(5.4)	(4.8)	73	77	81	83	86	91		
World											***************************************												

Negative values shown in parentheses. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.


<sup>6.</sup> Unemployment rate data source is Eurostat for EU member states; national unemployment series otherwise.

<sup>8.</sup> Türkiye and Ukraine budget balance figures are on their  $\underline{\text{central-government}}$  budget balances.

<sup>9.</sup> Unemployment for China is survey-based urban unemployment.

## Annex – Scope sovereign-rating levels\* compared against the US agency averages (notches)

Scope predicted early the 2022 and 2024 Eurobond debt restructurings of Ukraine (the sovereign currently rated selective default).




US agency average represents the mean of Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings. Represents Scope Ratings' portfolio of 38 publicly rated sovereigns. Calculated based on an alpha-numeric conversion on a 20-point scale from AAA (20) to D (1) with US agency ratings adjusted to the Scope rating scale. Positive/Negative Outlooks are treated with a +/-0.33 adjustment. Credit Watch positive/negative with a +/-0.67 adjustment. \*Long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency. As of 5 December 2025.

Macroeconomic Council: Sovereign Update 30

### Annex – Scope has a negative sovereign sector outlook entering 2026

#### Fitch has led the downgrades of sovereigns over 2025


The number of sovereign rating or Outlook changes this year



NB. Displayed are the rating agencies adopted by the Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework of the European Central Bank. Revisions of the five rating agencies of long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency this year only for the sovereigns Scope has rated publicly. \*Among the sovereigns that Scope rates, DBRS does not rate Georgia, Serbia, South Africa, Türkiye and Ukraine (as such, the above reflects rating changes or Outlook changes on a more restricted sample of publicly rated sovereigns for Morningstar DBRS).

#### **Scope sovereign-rating Outlooks**

The number of publicly rated sovereigns




\*No Outlook assigned for Ukraine presently while in selective default. Outlooks are on long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency. As of 5 December 2025. Source: Scope Ratings.

Macroeconomic Council: Sovereign Update 31

## **Annex – Platforms for accessing Scope economic projections**

#### Available on:





Bloomberg

LSEG Workspace

**Consensus Economics®** 

Macroeconomic Council 32



#### Contact

#### **Headquarters EU**

**BERLIN** Lennéstraße 5 D-10785 Berlin Phone +49 30 27891 0

#### Headquarters UK

LONDON 52 Grosvenor Gardens UK, London, SW1W 0AU Phone +44 20 3 93 68 151

#### **Nordics & Baltics**

OSLO Karenslyst allé 53 N-0279 Oslo Phone +47 21 09 38 35

#### **Central & Eastern Europe**

FRANKFURT AM MAIN Eurotheum Neue Mainzer Straße 66-68 D-60311 Frankfurt am Main Phone +49 69 66 77 389 0

POZNAŃ Władysława Andersa 7 PL, 61-894 Poznań

#### **Southern Europe**

**MADRID** Paseo de la Castellana 141 E-28046 Madrid Phone +34 919 491 662

MILAN Via Nino Bixio, 31 IT-20129 Milano MI Phone +39 02 8295 8254

#### **Western Europe**

**PARIS** 10 avenue de Messine FR-75008 Paris Phone +33 6 62 89 35 12





#### Disclaimer

© 2025 Scope SE & Co. KGaA and all its subsidiaries including Scope Ratings GmbH, Scope Ratings UK Limited, Scope Fund Analysis GmbH, Scope Innovation Lab GmbH, and Scope ESG Analysis GmbH (collectively, Scope). All rights reserved. The information and data supporting Scope's ratings, rating reports, rating opinions and related research and credit opinions originate from sources Scope considers to be reliable and accurate. Scope does not, however, independently verify the reliability and accuracy of the information and data. Scope's ratings, rating reports, rating opinions, or related research and credit opinions are provided 'as is' without any representation or warranty of any kind. In no circumstance shall Scope or its directors, officers, employees and other representatives be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental or other damages, expenses of any kind, or losses arising from any use of Scope's ratings, rating reports, rating opinions, related research or credit opinions. Ratings and other related credit opinions issued

by Scope are, and have to be viewed by any party as, opinions on relative credit risk and not a statement of fact or recommendation to purchase, hold or sell securities. Past performance does not necessarily predict future results. Any report issued by Scope is not a prospectus or similar document related to a debt security or issuing entity. Scope issues credit ratings and related research and opinions with the understanding and expectation that parties using them will assess independently the suitability of each security for investment or transaction purposes. Scope's credit ratings address relative credit risk, they do not address other risks such as market, liquidity, legal, or volatility. The information and data included herein is protected by copyright and other laws. To reproduce, transmit, transfer, disseminate, translate, resell, or store for subsequent use for any such purpose the information and data contained herein, contact Scope Ratings GmbH at Lennéstraße 5, D-10785 Berlin.