Summary

This rating methodology explains Scope's approach to assigning sovereign credit ratings.

The assessment continues to be based on five categories of sovereign risk: 'Domestic economic risk', 'Public finance risk', 'External economic risk', 'Financial stability risk' and ESG risks. The proposed updates to the methodology published on 27 September 2023 include changes to the quantitative model.

Specifically, we

i) assess all variables on fixed and transparently communicated thresholds;

ii) assess GDP/capita on a purchasing-power-parity basis and nominal GDP relative to World GDP;

iii) adjust our calculation for real GDP volatility and a country’s biocapacity relative to its resource consumption;

iv) replace our source for assessing natural disaster risks (WRI) with ND-GAIN; and

v) introduce a quantitative adjustment to capture political risks that are distinct from governance factors.

The changes could impact about seven sovereign ratings assigned by Scope.

*Editorial note: This methodology was republished on February 2 with minor editorial changes to ensure consistent labelling across the qualitative scorecard, specifically in Figures 1, 7a, 10, Annex II and IV.*
1. Introduction

This credit rating methodology details our methodological approach and credit rating criteria for the ratings of sovereign issuers and their debt issuances. Our ratings of a sovereign reflect our forward-looking assessment of its ability and willingness to honour debt obligations to private sector creditors in full and on time. Ratings are assigned to the issuer, i.e. the sovereign, and its debt instruments. We assign local-currency (LC) ratings and foreign-currency (FC) ratings using our long-term and short-term rating scales as described in section 1.1.3.

In assigning a sovereign issuer rating, we incorporate the significant factors affecting the risk of upholding timely and full payment of interest and principal in the future. Our rating methodology looks at a broad range of economic, fiscal, external, financial and ESG-related factors to assess the government’s ability and willingness to service its debt obligations.

Our sovereign rating methodology adds analytical value through:

- a comprehensive analysis using both quantitative and qualitative determinants of sovereign risk;
- a forward-looking rating framework explicitly incorporating five-year forecasts where available;
- the inclusion of financial stability risk to explicitly account for risks stemming from the banking sector;
- the inclusion of credit risk in relation to environmental, social and governance aspects; and
- rigorous rating analysis using sophisticated scoring systems to enhance transparency.

The methodology provides a detailed explanation of our analytical framework and rating approach, including the rationale for each key rating factor as well as more granular assessment criteria. The methodology is based on scorecards that allow a consistent assessment of the relative strength of rated sovereigns and enhances rating transparency and comparability.

To structure the rating process and ensure comparability across the peer group, we divide the sovereign analysis into five broad-based analytical categories, each of which contains quantitative and qualitative considerations:

1. Domestic economic risk
2. Public finances risk
3. External economic risk
4. Financial stability risk
5. Environmental, social and governance risk

We use our sovereign quantitative model (SQM) as the first step for determining an indicative sovereign rating. The SQM aggregates the main components of the five rating categories and yields a score, which is mapped to the long-term rating scale. For sovereigns with a reserve currency included in the IMF Special Drawing Rights basket, we automatically adjust this indicative rating upward by 1-3 notches. Conversely, for sovereigns with elevated political risk as assessed by the World Bank’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator, we automatically adjust this indicative rating downwards by 1-3 notches.

We complement the SQM with a qualitative scorecard (QS) to account for analytical elements that cannot be captured quantitatively. The QS serves as a qualitative adjustment of the quantitative indicative rating, with a possible adjustment of ±3 notches except when additional considerations apply, as detailed in Chapter 5.

Applying a formal and rigorous qualitative framework in the sovereign credit risk analysis has several benefits. First, it supplements our analysis of fundamental fiscal and macro-economic variables. We believe that a robust, qualitative framework helps with identifying changes in sovereign risk. Second, it allows us to assess the cascading impacts of alternative macro-economic assumptions and policy responses as well as the availability and quality of the potential action and reactions of governments and institutions that may be material for sovereign credit risk.
1.1 Rating definitions

1.1.1 Definition of a sovereign issuer

We define sovereigns as member states of the International Monetary Fund\(^1\).

Our ratings assigned to sovereigns or their issuances apply only to the risks faced by private sector creditors. The rating does not reflect a sovereign’s ability and willingness to service other types of obligations, such as:

- obligations to multilateral development institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank; or
- obligations to other governments (Paris Club debt or intergovernmental debt).

Our ratings do not refer to risks faced by these official sector institutions as they typically enjoy preferential treatment\(^2\). However, and for the avoidance of doubt, such sovereign obligations to non-private institutions are accounted for in our risk assessment of private sector obligations.

1.1.2 Definition of a sovereign default

Our definition of default is applicable to sovereign debt obligations. We will also treat the following events as a default:

- failure to service debt owed to private creditors by the sovereign other than loans or bonds;
- missed coupon or principal repayment on non-sovereign debt owed to private creditors benefiting from an irrevocable and unconditional guarantee issued by the sovereign; and
- any debt exchange or distressed-debt restructuring affecting private creditors that i) leads to less favourable terms or a loss of value compared to the original terms of the debt, including unilateral or coercive currency redenomination, and ii) has the effect of avoiding a likely default\(^3\).

Scope’s rating definitions and associated default probabilities associated with rating levels are available here.

1.1.3 Local- and foreign-currency ratings

We assign LC and FC ratings using our long-term and short-term rating scales.

The ability and willingness to pay in LC or FC debt is typically the same among investment-grade rated sovereigns (i.e. those rated BBB+- and above). In rare cases for non-investment-grade rated sovereigns, we may assign a higher LC rating than the FC rating if default risk varies between FC and LC debts. In such cases, the following key factor(s) would need to be met:

- Weak external fundamentals and outstanding risks as associated with currency depreciation;
- Significant proportion of central government debt burdened in FC;
- Established domestic capital markets and stronger capacity to refinance debt in LC; and/or
- Past preferential treatment of its LC versus FC debt or a strong basis for future willingness or capacity to pay LC versus FC debt.

Finally, in exceptional circumstances, such as debt sustainability challenges concentrated on LC, we could rate LC debt below FC debt. Annex III provides an overview of the default history of FC debt against LC debt.

1.1.4 Mapping from long-term to short-term ratings

We derive short-term ratings from the long-term ratings. The relevant elements for the differentials between LC and FC long-term ratings are the same for the short-term ratings. Accordingly, FC and LC short-term ratings are not always aligned.

1.1.5 Short-term local- and foreign-currency ratings

Our rating definitions provide five possible and overlapping short-term ratings over five long-term rating categories. The ability exclusive to a sovereign to create its own currency and obtain privileged market access typically results in higher financial flexibility and short-term solvency than for other issuers, for example, similarly rated corporates and financial institutions. As a result, for FC and LC short-term ratings, we will choose the higher of the two for sovereigns benefiting from an established reserve currency.

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\(^1\) The one exception is Hong Kong.

\(^2\) Preferred creditor status reflects the incentives of a borrowing sovereign to prioritise debt repayment to multilateral institutions. These incentives include continued access to funds, availability of cheaper terms with longer maturities and the threat of sanctions.

\(^3\) For example, an extension of maturities, a reduced principal amount, lower coupon or interest rates, a change in the currency of payment, or effective subordination.
sizeable foreign-exchange reserves or strong financial and policy flexibility. Conversely, we will choose the lower of the two for sovereigns with depleted reserves and low financial and policy flexibility.

### 1.1.6 Model data and sources

Our analysis is based predominantly on public information from a variety of sources. We may consider the confidential information submitted by sovereign issuers actively participating in the rating process. These sources include supranational organisations (such as the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements), national statistical offices, national central banks, other government agencies and ministries, and other generally accepted sources. We will not rate a sovereign if data is lacking in coverage or quality, or if issues place the utility of the data into question.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 Overview

Five risk categories are critical for our sovereign credit ratings: i) domestic economic risk, ii) public finance risk, iii) external economic risk, iv) financial stability risk, and v) environmental, social and governance risk. For each risk category, we analyse a group of key quantitative and qualitative factors to capture the state of a sovereign’s creditworthiness.

### Figure 1: Five categories of sovereign credit risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sovereign Risk Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>% Variable</th>
<th>Reserve currency*</th>
<th>Political Risk**</th>
<th>Qualitative Scorecard</th>
<th>Add. Cons.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Economic Risk</td>
<td>Wealth &amp; size</td>
<td>65.0 GDP per capita (PPP)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
<td>1. Growth potential and outlook</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth, inflation &amp; unemployment</td>
<td>35.0 Real GDP growth, Real GDP volatility, Inflation rate, Unemployment rate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>[0; -3]</td>
<td>1. Fiscal policy framework</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Finance Risk</td>
<td>Debt affordability</td>
<td>50.0 Interest payments/revenues, GG Gross debt/revenues</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Current account resilience</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debt dynamics</td>
<td>50.0 Primary balance/GD, GG Gross debt/GDP</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. External debt structure</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Economic Risk</td>
<td>International Position</td>
<td>40.0 Net IIP/GDP</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Resilience to short-term shocks</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current account</td>
<td>40.0 Current account balance/GDP</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Stability Risk</td>
<td>External debt sustainability</td>
<td>20.0 Reserves/imports</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG Risk</td>
<td>Banking sector</td>
<td>66.7 Tier 1 ratio</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Banking sector performance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>33.3 Private sector credit growth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Financial sector oversight &amp; governance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Positive adjustment to sovereign whose currency is included in the IMF’s SDR basket.  
** Political risk based on WB’s political stability and absence of violence/Terrorism indicator.  
Governance based on average of other five World Bank Governance Indicators.  
*** Biocapacity: carbon footprint of consumption.

Source: Scope Ratings

The final rating recommendation to the rating committee is derived over five stages. The first stage involves a rigorous review of data and forecasts. This review is based on historical data, estimates and projections on 28 economic, financial and political variables that we consider the most relevant. A quantitative score is mapped to an indicative rating on the long-term rating scale. In the second stage, we adjust the indicative rating upward by up to three notches for sovereigns issuing in a global reserve currency included in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket to account for the associated benefits in a systematic and transparent manner. In the third stage, we adjust the indicative rating downward by up to three notches for sovereigns with elevated political risks as captured by the World Bank’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism variable.

The fourth stage involves the use of the qualitative scorecard, which uses 15 qualitative assessments to refine the analysis, adjusting for sovereign-specific elements that cannot be captured quantitatively. Among these elements are assumptions about policy...
direction and implementation as well as the credibility and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. We use the QS to ensure rigorous, systematic and transparent analysis of qualitative forward-looking factors. The qualitative adjustment to the quantitatively derived indicative rating is ± 3 notches, except in extraordinary circumstances as detailed in chapter 5. The fifth stage relates to any relevant credit considerations not yet captured by the model or scorecard, which the analyst presents to the rating committee. The rating committee decides on the final rating.

Figure 2: Sovereign rating process summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1: Sovereign Quantitative model (SQM)</th>
<th>Quantitative score using 28 variables for 125+ countries resulting in an indicative rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Reserve currency (RC)</td>
<td>Positive adjustment of 1-3 notches to indicative rating if the currency is in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3: Political risk</td>
<td>Negative adjustment of 1-3 notches to indicative rating if the country has elevated political risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4: Qualitative scorecard (QS)</td>
<td>15 qualitative factors with potential ± 3 notch adjustment in aggregate to the quantitative indicative rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5: Additional considerations</td>
<td>To account for considerations or extraordinary circumstances not captured by our model and scorecard to determine the final rating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In determining the final rating, the rating committee considers the sovereign’s performance in each of the quantitative and qualitative analytical categories. The committee also considers relevant rating aspects that are insufficiently captured in the previous analytical stages but have emerged in the rating committee discussion.

2.2 Domestic economic risk

Figure 3: Domestic economic risk

- GDP per capita
- Nominal GDP
- Real GDP growth
- Real GDP volatility
- Inflation rate
- Unemployment

+ Growth potential and outlook
- Monetary policy framework
- Macro-economic stability and sustainability

Domestic economic risk

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors

The domestic economic risk factor focuses on the sovereign’s ability to support sustainable long-term growth and adapt to a variety of shocks. A record of continued growth is a key indicator of a sovereign's ability to generate fiscal revenues. High domestic economic risk or weak economic prospects have proved decisive in past sovereign defaults: many recent defaults and debt restructurings have resulted from years of adverse macro-economic developments and, for countries dependent on commodity exports, extended price drops of commodity prices.

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5 Tomz and Wright (2007) report that 62% of defaults over the last 200 years occurred in years where the level of output in the defaulting country was below its long-run trend.
The quantitative factors measure the dynamics of the economy, expressed in real GDP growth rates and GDP volatility, as well as the country’s economic resilience as reflected in GDP per capita and nominal GDP. Other factors include inflation and unemployment rates. Further details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are provided in Annex I.

High per-capita incomes are associated with higher economic and financial wealth and suggest the predominance of high value-added activities in the economy (though not always applicable to countries which mainly export commodities). Economies with high nominal GDPs also tend to be more resilient to shocks. Volatile real GDP growth indicates macro-economic imbalances, increasing uncertainty about a sovereign’s ability to repay obligations in full and on time.

An economy with inflation rates that deviate from levels that can sustain economic growth, for example, sustained periods of deflation or double-digit inflation rates, indicate underlying distortions that are harmful for economic performance. High unemployment rates over extended periods point to structurally weak labour markets. Institutional barriers that impede labour re-allocation across economic activities may seriously hamper growth and weaken a country’s ability to absorb shocks.

Qualitative factors

We complement the quantitative indicators with qualitative considerations on a country’s growth potential and outlook, monetary policy framework and macro-economic stability and sustainability.

We examine historical growth trends and the country's growth prospects in the medium to long term. This entails assessing a sovereign’s robustness, flexibility and growth potential, in addition to assessing structural rigidities that may affect the sovereign’s economic performance or make it more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.

We also assess a country’s monetary policy framework and foreign exchange policies. A sovereign’s ability to pursue an efficient and coordinated set of monetary policies mitigates the risks of economic and financial shocks, supporting a faster economic recovery and more sustainable growth. We review the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy based on the record of central banks in meeting objectives and responding to shocks. Independence of the central bank includes monetary authorities’ degree of freedom in the timing and use of instruments, legally guaranteed independence from political interference, and budgetary independence.

We also consider aspects that can prevent a central bank from achieving its policies. Shallow and undiversified domestic financial systems and capital markets may constrain the effectiveness of monetary policy, with weak transmission mechanisms from the banking sector to the real economy. A rigid exchange rate regime\(^6\) may prevent a central bank from effectively influencing domestic inflation dynamics as policy objectives may conflict with the monetary policy of maintaining the exchange rate at set levels.

The macro-economic stability and sustainability assessment evaluates structural strengths and weaknesses conducive to a sovereign’s growth prospects. We consider over-reliance on a specific industry or economic activity to be a weakness. We measure an economy’s diversification based on the proportion of value added by sectors in the country’s annual output. Over-reliance on external markets also poses significant risks. Shortfalls in domestic savings may force a reliance on external funding and expose an economy to foreign investor sentiment, increasing vulnerability to external shocks.

2.3 Public finance risk

Figure 4: Public finance risk

\[ \text{Public finance risk} = \text{Interest payments/revenues} + \text{Fiscal policy framework} + \text{Long-term debt trajectory} + \text{Debt profile and market access} \]

Source: Scope Ratings

\(^6\) Rigid exchange rate regimes include all regimes other than free-floating, as classified by the IMF in the publication ‘Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions’.
Rationale and quantitative factors

The analysis of public finance risk focuses on a sovereign's ability to maintain a strong balance sheet and repay maturing debt. We assess public finance strength using three key quantitative variables: the general government (GG) primary budget balance, interest payments as a percentage of general government revenues, and gross GG debt as a percentage of general government revenues and GDP. Further details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are provided in Annex I.

Many sovereign defaults are triggered by persistent fiscal imbalances. For example, a period of budget deficits lasting longer than a period of economic downturn points to structural issues which, if not tackled, may lead to a build-up of debt and hinder the sovereign's ability to service or refinance debt. A persistent primary-budget deficit may also indicate a low capacity to service debt from own resources and an overreliance on markets to refinance.

We evaluate the GG primary balance and forecasts, as well as a sovereign's current and potential indebtedness by analysing debt levels and debt affordability ratios. Though both gross and net debt ratios are comprehensive measures of sovereign debt, the history of sovereign defaults (see Annex III) suggests that high debt levels do not necessarily lead to default. A key indicator that captures this is the debt affordability ratio, i.e. GG interest payments relative to budgeted revenues.

Qualitative factors

We complement the quantitative fiscal risk variables with qualitative assessments of a sovereign's fiscal policy framework, long-term debt trajectory, and debt profile and market access.

Our analysis of a sovereign's fiscal framework evaluates a government's ability to generate revenues, plan and control expenditures, as well as the consistency, appropriateness and transparency of budgetary policies and processes, and their adequacy across various phases of the economic cycle and its synchronisation with monetary policy. We assess revenue flexibility as the ability to raise revenues through higher tax rates, an expansion of the tax base, or the sale of sovereign assets. Also important to the analysis is a sovereign's record of controlling expenditures, and the spending demands from an ageing population (pensions and healthcare).

The underlying drivers of sovereign debt dynamics are central to our analysis. We use a debt sustainability framework to assess a sovereign's debt trajectory under various scenarios. Public debt dynamics are analysed through medium- and long-term debt projections accompanied by sensitivity analyses. This enables us to examine the fiscal position of sovereigns, assessing their resilience to sudden episodes of fiscal stress that may occur following the materialisation of public finance or macro financial risks. Medium-term sustainability challenges are assessed by focusing on the sovereign's initial budgetary position, and the levels and projected development of its debt. Within the debt sustainability analysis, we also examine a sovereign's exposure to a wide range of contingent liabilities and assess the risk of their materialisation.

These include:

- contingent liabilities associated with the banking sector as well as state-guaranteed bank lending schemes
- contingent liabilities related to the non-financial sector, including government related entities
- explicit guarantees by the sovereign and other implicit off-budget commitments (pension obligations, extra-budgetary funds, securitisations and public-private partnerships) not included in the previous two groups

We also assess a sovereign's debt profile, market access and the ability to issue under stressed scenarios. We examine the composition, maturities, interest rates and currency structures of a sovereign's debt issues. Long maturities and durations make refinancing and interest rate shocks less likely. Conversely, significant foreign currency borrowings expose the sovereign to currency risk in times of financial and economic stress. Other areas of focus include, but are not limited to, the depth of the domestic capital market, access to concessional and multilateral sources of funding, cash buffers, and sovereign wealth funds.

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7 Baldacci et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of fiscal stress periods, covering public debt default as well as near-default events.
8 The defaults of Moldova in 2002, Greece in 2012 and most recently Ukraine in 2015 are examples of such types of sovereign defaults.
9 Bova et al. (2016) find that the average fiscal cost of a contingent liability realisation for the period 1990–2014 is 6% of GDP but costs can be as high as 40% for major financial sector bailouts.
2.4 External economic risk

Figure 5: External economic risk

- Current account balance
- International investment position
- Reserves/imports

+ Current account resilience
- External debt structure
- Resilience to short-term external shocks

= External economic risk

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors

The analysis of external economic risk focuses on the soundness and sustainability of a sovereign’s external position and its resilience to external shocks. Persistent current account deficits, high net external debtor positions and limited external buffers, including over-reliance on short-term funding, are potential sources of external vulnerabilities, not only for emerging markets but in advanced countries as well. These vulnerabilities may reflect unsustainable consumption, asset price booms or a loss of competitiveness amplified by collapse in investor confidence and may lead to financial and economic crises and hence compromise sovereign creditworthiness.

Our quantitative indicators for the external economic risk factors include the current account balance, the net international investment position (NIIP), and reserves/imports coverage. Details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables are provided in Annex I.

Qualitative factors

We complement the external economic risk score with qualitative assessments of a sovereign’s current account vulnerabilities, external debt structure, and resilience to short-term external shocks.

Volatile current account receipts undermine a sovereign’s ability to generate stable and reliable external revenues. Reliance on a single commodity (e.g. oil), a single service (e.g. tourism), or a single country for foreign worker remittances may expose the sovereign to shocks and sharp downturns of these commodity markets and respective countries.

We evaluate the sustainability of external debt by focusing on the development and structure of external debt in both private and public sectors. We pay specific attention to economic sectors – households, corporates, banks, or the public sector – that are responsible for any external debt overhang and the sustainability of funding sources for the accumulated debt. We also review potential spill-over of private debt onto public sector balance sheets. Another important factor is the quality of the sources for external debt. Sovereigns with sizeable foreign direct investments or equity in local companies are less prone to capital flight during financial market turbulence. Portfolio and other debt-like capital inflows can prove more volatile and may result in an unsustainable build-up of external debt. We also review access to international capital markets, especially for emerging markets, and the affordability of capital from such markets. Finally, we assess the maturity profile of external debt, with an elevated share of short-term debt implying high short-term roll-over needs and therefore a higher exposure to changes in access to external financing.

For our assessment of a sovereign’s resilience to short-term external shocks, we look at the sovereign’s available external liquidity, such as international foreign-exchange reserves compared to external financing needs, including short-term external debt (original maturity short-term debt and current-year principal payments on long-term debt) and non-residents’ deposits in domestic banks. Generally, emerging market economies are more exposed to ‘original sin’ problems and spill-over from financial markets. A low external liquidity ratio may signal weakness in the ability of major economic sectors to withstand a temporary loss of investor confidence and hence in the sovereign’s ability to service debt using domestic resources when refinancing through external creditors becomes unavailable. Conversely, sovereigns with large assets (e.g. significant wealth funds) are assessed positively.

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10 ‘Original sin’ is the inability of emerging market economies to finance externally in domestic currency.
2.5 Financial stability risk

Figure 6: Financial stability risk

- Non-performing loans
- Tier 1 ratio
- Private sector credit growth

+ Banking sector performance
- Financial sector oversight and governance
- Financial imbalances

= Financial stability risk

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors

The analysis financial stability risk focuses on assessing the financial sector’s overall strength and soundness, the effectiveness of regulation and supervision by the sovereign, and financial imbalances in the economy. The financial sector is critical to economic development, given its role as a collector of savings, as an intermediary between savers and borrowers, and as a provider of payment infrastructure. In this regard, we capture the key sources of systemic risk which may challenge macro-economic stability. There is significant empirical evidence of the link between systemic financial sector crises and sovereign defaults. The vulnerability of sovereigns to the strength of their financial sector has been prevalent in emerging market economies (currency crises, sudden stops) but also in advanced economies since the Great Financial Crisis.

Such crises may translate into sovereign debt crises through two channels of transmission. The first relates to the government’s role to safeguard the financial system and the resulting materialisation of government-contingent liabilities adversely impacting fiscal sustainability. The second relates to the macro-economic situation at the time of a crisis. A crisis in the financial sector may trigger a severe recession that weakens the sovereign’s fiscal position.

We also focus on the impact of a potential sovereign default on the solvency of financial institutions, given the losses these institutions may incur as a result of sovereign debt holdings and funding costs. Although sovereigns and financial institutions may be independent, interdependencies create feedback loops: problems on one side can be amplified by negative feedback into the other. Under these circumstances, financial sector crises can weaken sovereign creditworthiness. Our quantitative variables for assessing financial stability risks include non-performing loans, the Tier 1 ratio, and private sector credit growth. Details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are provided in Annex I.

Qualitative factors

We complement these variables by examining a country’s overall banking sector performance, financial sector oversight and governance, and financial imbalances.

We analyse the main indicators of financial soundness including asset quality, profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy. A highly leveraged financial sector may be characterised by volatile funding structures with excessive reliance on wholesale funding or short-maturity instruments in foreign currencies. High leverage may expose a sovereign to large vulnerabilities that can undermine financial stability.

We assess the level of financial sector oversight including banking sector regulatory and supervisory frameworks, macro- or micro-prudential policies, and anti-money laundering or countering the financing of terrorism frameworks. Strong regulatory and oversight mechanisms are critical to reduce systemic risks in the financial system and support a sovereign’s resilience to shocks and contagion.

We also examine the extent of an economy’s financial imbalances related to variations in credit growth, high household and corporate debt and high asset prices as these may have a sizeable impact on sovereign creditworthiness. We focus on credit-

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11 See Balteanu and Erce (2014) and Correa and Sapriza (2014) for a detailed examination linking banking crises and sovereign defaults in emerging markets.
12 Bova et al (2016) estimates of the fiscal costs of financial crises across advanced economies and emerging markets suggest between 5% and 15% of GDP.
13 Financial institutions highly exposed to the sovereign have shown larger increases in solvency risk, sharper reductions in loans and more noticeable rises in lending rates than institutions less exposed.
14 Financial institutions’ exposure to domestic sovereign risk via government bond holdings amplified the transmission of stress to the banking system during the recent eurozone crisis. Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli (2016) establish that sovereign exposure has a causal role in this amplification mechanism.
growth dynamics, which are closely associated with financial crises and take into account a sovereign’s financial development to identify the potential for financial bubbles, especially for housing, stock or commodity markets. Such bubbles, when burst, may have a long-term effect on economic activity. The danger of asset price bubbles is that they may be self-reinforcing, especially if fuelled by financial leverage and lax credit standards. For sovereigns with a low, but increasing, level of credit (typical in the developing world), rapid credit growth may point to a deepening of capital and financial markets, the emergence of new credit products, and an increase in the population’s wealth and income.

2.6 Environmental, social and governance risk
This risk pillar comprises three separate risk categories: environmental, social and governance-related factors. Importantly, we recognise that environmental and social challenges are largely structural and likely to materialise over the longer term than the rating factors presented above. Still, they require an ambitious and timely policy response today and are increasingly relevant to sovereign credit quality. As such, our qualitative assessments for environmental and social factors account for long-term considerations including the adequacy of current policies to tackle these challenges.

Figure 7a: Environmental factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition risks</th>
<th>Natural disaster risks</th>
<th>Resource risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+                   | Qualitative environmental factors |
=  Environmental factors

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors
Environmental factors are increasingly relevant for sovereign credit risk and will impact both demand and supply in the decades to come and may even disrupt the entire economic and financial system. Examples include rising costs from more frequent and extreme weather conditions as well as structural change economies may have to undertake as and when policymakers and regulators adopt and climate policies such as carbon pricing. Natural resource constraints (resource-security) are also possible depending on a country’s consumption and production, its trade relations facilitating access to raw materials, and available physical biocapacity within its borders. Conversely, some sovereigns may also benefit from climate change.

Our quantitative variables for assessing environmental risks include transition risks captured via CO₂ emissions per GDP and GHG emissions per capita, natural disaster risks as measured by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), and resource risks measured by a country’s ecological footprint of consumption relative to its biocapacity. Further details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are provided in Annex I.

Qualitative factors
These variables, which capture a sovereign’s current environmental risks, are complemented by our qualitative assessment of its government’s willingness and ability to mitigate these risks. We assess environmental policy responses in view of the types of risks sovereigns face. For instance, transition risks should be met with ambitious climate mitigation while natural disaster risks are best addressed through climate adaptation.

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15 Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) find that two out of five real estate market downturns were associated with systemic banking crises in advanced economies.
18 UNEP, 2012. A new angle on sovereign credit risk
Sovereign Rating Methodology
Sovereign and Public Sector

Figure 7b: Social risk

- Old-age-dependency ratio
- Income inequality
- Labour force participation

+ Qualitative social factors

= Social factors

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors

Social risks have a fundamental impact on economic development and social cohesion and can thus affect a sovereign's growth and public finance outlook as well as its political risks over the medium term. These risks therefore conceptually have an important interaction with other risk categories in our methodology, particularly, domestic economic risk, public finance risk and institutional and political risk. This part of the analysis focuses on persistent, structural features of an economy and society. Our quantitative variables for assessing social risks include the old-age dependency ratio, income inequality as measured via the income share of the bottom 50%, and the labour force participation rate. Further details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are presented in Annex I.

Qualitative factors

These variables, which capture a sovereign's current social risks, are complemented by our qualitative assessment of additional factors, which include those related to poverty, and the quality and sustainability of social systems and their implications for human capital formation, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. Finally, we form a view on governments' willingness and ability to mitigate these risks through social policies.

Figure 7c: Governance risk

- Control of corruption
- Voice and accountability
- Rule of law
- Governance effectiveness
- Regulatory quality

+ Qualitative governance factors

= Governance factors

Source: Scope Ratings

Rationale and quantitative factors

The analysis of governance factors focuses on the strength, soundness and policy implementation capacity of a country's institutions. Sovereign defaults may be triggered by weak institutions or a country's inability to formulate and implement appropriate policies in a timely way, which directly or indirectly affect their perceived willingness to service debt. Our quantitative indicators for governance risks are five of the six governance indices compiled by the World Bank: control of corruption, the rule of law, the voice and accountability, governance effectiveness, and regulatory quality. Further details on the rationale for the adoption of these variables in the SQM are provided in Annex I.

Qualitative factors

The quantitative variables are supplemented by assessments of qualitative factors that include recent events, policy, and institutional risks and considerations that may materially affect sovereign creditworthiness. Our analysis emphasises the sovereign's ability to implement structural reforms and fiscal consolidation, which may be politically difficult. We also review policy risk and overall orientation, predictability, and efficacy of government policy, focusing on measures and initiatives most likely to impact economic and financial conditions. We also examine the frequency of changes in government, parliamentary compositions, and the sovereign's record in dealing with past political and economic crises.
3. Sovereign quantitative model (SQM)

We use our sovereign quantitative model as the first step for determining an indicative sovereign rating. The SQM encompasses the five analytical categories we apply to sovereign ratings. While the SQM is not a predictive model of default, it does assess a sovereign’s relative credit strengths and weaknesses, allowing for a comprehensive quantitative analysis.

Figure 8: Five categories of sovereign credit risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sovereign Risk Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Reserve currency*</th>
<th>Political Risk**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Economic Risk (35%)</strong></td>
<td>Wealth &amp; size</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nominal GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth, inflation &amp; unemployment</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>Real GDP growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; -3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Real GDP volatility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Finance Risk (20%)</strong></td>
<td>Debt affordability</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Interest payments/ revenues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GG Gross debt/ revenues</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debt dynamics</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Primary balance/ GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GG Gross debt/ GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Economic Risk (10%)</strong></td>
<td>International Position</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>Net IIP/GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; -3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current account</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>Current account balance/GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; -3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External debt sustainability</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>Reserves/Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Stability Risk (10%)</strong></td>
<td>Banking sector</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>Non performing loans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tier 1 ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>Private sector credit growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESG Risk (25%)</strong></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>Transition risks: CO2/GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition risks: GHG/capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Natural disaster risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biocapacity**</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>Old-age-dependency ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Income inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>WB Governance indicators**</td>
<td></td>
<td>[0; +3]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Positive adjustment to sovereigns whose currency is included in the IMF’s SDR basket.
** Political risk based on WB’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator.
Governance based on average of other five World Bank Governance Indicators.
** Biocapacity/ carbon footprint of consumption.

Source: Scope Ratings

We have chosen 28 quantitative variables as the basis of a rigorous quantitative analysis. These were chosen based on empirical research, economic theory, academic studies on factors driving historical defaults\(^{19}\), analytical judgment, and availability. We consider these indicators to be good predictors of default and sovereign distress and hence offer strong explanatory power.

To calculate the quantitative score, we use a minimum-maximum algorithm for each of the 28 variables, which ranges from 1 to 100 as per the indicative rating. We use fixed minimum and maximum thresholds for each variable and place each sovereign within this range. Sovereigns with the strongest results for each rating indicator receive the highest rating score; sovereigns with the weakest results receive the lowest rating score.

For example, in the hypothetical situation where the positive (negative) threshold of a variable is identified as the value 1 (-8), the score of a variable with the value 0.5 (thus being close to the ‘best’ score) would be derived using the following calculation: $1 + 99 \times \left| \frac{X - \text{MIN}}{\text{MAX} - \text{MIN}} \right| / (0.5 - (-8)) / (1 - (-8)) = 94.5$.

---

\(^{19}\) These Include Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Manasse and Roubini (2003) and Baldacci et al. (2011).
Scores are aggregated using a weighted average score to generate an overall rating score. In a final step, we use the aggregated quantitative score to determine the indicative rating as shown in the following table.

The indicative ratings are in lower case to differentiate them from the final rating determined by the rating committee. We note that movements between indicative ratings are only determined after the analyst’s review of quantitative results and are documented and approved by a rating committee during review of the rating. The aim is to avoid scores which are at the limit of indicative ratings to move too rapidly and too frequently into another indicative rating thus creating unnecessary rating volatility.

Figure 9: Mapping sovereign quantitative model scores to indicative ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aaa</th>
<th>80.0-100.0</th>
<th>bb+</th>
<th>46.7-50.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aa+</td>
<td>76.7-80.0</td>
<td>bb</td>
<td>43.3-46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aa</td>
<td>73.3-76.7</td>
<td>bb-</td>
<td>40.0-43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aa-</td>
<td>70.0-73.3</td>
<td>b+</td>
<td>36.7-40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a+</td>
<td>66.7-70.0</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>33.3-36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>63.3-66.7</td>
<td>b-</td>
<td>30.0-33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a-</td>
<td>60.0-63.3</td>
<td>ccc</td>
<td>20.0-30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bbb+</td>
<td>56.7-60.0</td>
<td>cc</td>
<td>10.0-20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bbb</td>
<td>53.3-56.7</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>1.0-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bb-</td>
<td>50.0-53.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scope Ratings

3.1 Forecasts and thresholds

The SQM incorporates historical, current and forward-looking data. As economic data and forecasts are revised and changed, we update the SQM quarterly, reviewing each country at least twice yearly. We use publicly available macro-economic and financial data with five-year forecasts for 11\(^2\) of the 28 selected variables (see Annex I). We calculate a weighted average before deploying the rating algorithm, providing a single data point that includes the last year of historical data, current-year data and a five-year forecast where available. This algorithm uses a dynamic weighting process in which weights for $T_0$ and $T_{+1}$ change over a calendar year. This is because data availability improves the quality of forecasts, resulting in an assignment of higher weight to $T_{+1}$ at the end of a calendar year.

We use forecasts to form a forward-looking opinion on sovereign risk assuming a through-the-cycle approach. Consequently, we believe a rating is more likely to change when an economy undergoes a clear structural change or when the phase of the cycle has exposed fundamental weaknesses or strengths in sovereign creditworthiness.

The relation between quantitative indicators and sovereign risks may differ across countries. The SQM rating score does not represent a linear relationship between quantitative indicators and sovereign default risks. The SQM acts primarily as a scoring tool to help form a recommendation for the rating committee. Essential to our approach are the indicative rating peer groups, which include the peers in the adjacent indicative ratings generated by the SQM. These allow comparative analysis across sovereigns and across time. This is essential to ensure consistency and provides the basis for the qualitative assessment in the QS.

3.2 Reserve Currency

Global currencies are widely used in cross-border monetary operations, finance and trade. For the few issuing sovereigns, these currencies come with both benefits and costs and can therefore affect creditworthiness significantly. An international currency is much more than a foreign exchange reserve for central banks. It fulfills the three traditional functions of money for both private and public actors: a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. An international currency provides a host of benefits for the

\(^2\) Old-age dependency ratio is forecast through 2030.
issuing country. First, borrowing costs for the issuing sovereign are reduced due to high demand for its currency, increasing fiscal space and the ability to raise spending without materially affecting debt sustainability. In addition, domestic banks in the issuing country have access to the central bank’s liquidity facilities, which translates into a competitive advantage over foreign banks. Domestic firms also benefit as their exchange rate risks are lower than those of foreign firms. Finally, a global reserve currency can be used by the issuing country politically, for instance, via sanctions, bolstering the country’s global hegemony.

At the same time, an international currency has costs. During times of global distress, they can appreciate strongly due to their safe-haven status, adversely affecting the cost-competitiveness of domestic producers. In addition, the absence of credible fiscal rules, low borrowing costs and sustained demand for its debt securities may induce governments to pursue fiscal expansion, resulting in high public debt. Countries issuing international currencies also face policy constraints as strong debt movements can increase interest rate volatility, complicating monetary policymaking.

There is no accepted list of global currencies, but the closest official recognition is a currency’s inclusion in the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket, created as a supplementary international reserve asset. While the abovementioned costs are captured in our SQM, particularly via the public finance risk and external economic risk pillars, benefits can be substantial but difficult to quantify. Therefore, for the few sovereigns which issue in a global reserve currency as defined above, we adjust the indicative rating by a minimum of +1 and a maximum of +3 notches based on the weight the currency receives in the IMF’s SDR basket. Specifically, currencies with a weight of around 30% (20%) or above receive +3 (+2) notches, otherwise +1 notch. For now, for a sovereign in the euro area monetary union, we adjust the currency’s weight in the SDR basket by the capital held by the member state’s central bank as a shareholder of the ECB. We could change our assessment depending on institutional progress made towards a fully-fledged capital markets union in Europe and/or credible, permanent tools of the ECB allowing for policy interventions away from its capital key over the medium-to-long-term.

3.3 Political risk

Sovereign defaults may be triggered by political instability and exposure to domestic and external conflicts, including sustained protests, social instability, civil unrest, political or ethnic violence, secession or independence movements, armed political opposition, and military takeovers as well as geopolitical risks such as conflicts, tensions or armed conflict with or in neighbouring countries, economic sanctions or security threats.

These considerations, which we classify as political risk and thus as distinct from governance risks, directly or indirectly affect the willingness and ability of governments to service debt. The importance of political risk is underlined by its frequent contribution to sovereign defaults over past decades. For the avoidance of doubt, we do not mean to assess “country risk”, which usually refers to the risk of government interfering with business operations.

Political risk is thus hard to measure, at times chronic or persistent and in other instances sudden and acute. While no quantitative indicator captures these risk considerations in a fully objective, accurate, consistent and timely manner, we rely on the World Bank’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism index as our key input variable.

Specifically, we use a three-year average of the World Bank’s political risk score and map it directly to negative notch adjustments to our indicative ratings. This assessment cannot provide uplift to the ratings. If the World Bank’s indicator score is equal to or above 0.00, we make no negative adjustment. Conversely, if the score is below 0.00 (-0.75) we will make a 1-notch (2-notch) negative adjustment to the indicative rating. If the score is below -1.25, we will make a negative 3-notch adjustment to the indicative rating.

Finally, in case of sudden and severe events or political developments materially affecting our view of a country’s creditworthiness, which may be positive or negative compared to the quantitative indicator, we will adjust the final rating per the ‘Additional considerations’ section.

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²¹ Capital markets union: Final report by High-Level Forum pushes for the completion of the CMU.
²² External conflict with Russia, coupled with a change in the country’s leadership, contributed greatly to the default by Ukraine on a USD 18bn Eurobond in 2015. Other recent examples of defaults driven by political risk include Paraguay’s debt restructuring in 2002-04 and Ecuador’s default in 2008.
4. Qualitative scorecard (QS)

We complement the SQM with a qualitative scorecard (QS) to account for analytical elements not captured within the SQM. The QS is designed to expand on the SQM. It is organised into five risk pillars in the SQM (domestic economic risk, public finances risk, external economic risk, financial stability risk, and ESG risk), and includes three analytical components per pillar. The weights in the QS are the same across each category.

**Figure 10: Five categories of sovereign credit risk (QS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic economic risk (20%)</th>
<th>Public finance risk (20%)</th>
<th>External economic risk (20%)</th>
<th>Financial stability risk (20%)</th>
<th>ESG risk (20%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Growth potential and outlook</td>
<td>• Fiscal policy framework</td>
<td>• Current account resilience</td>
<td>• Banking sector performance</td>
<td>• Environmental factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monetary policy framework</td>
<td>• Long-term debt trajectory</td>
<td>• External debt structure</td>
<td>• Financial sector oversight and governance</td>
<td>• Social factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Macro-economic stability and sustainability</td>
<td>• Debt profile and market access</td>
<td>• Resilience to short-term external shocks</td>
<td>• Financial imbalances</td>
<td>• Governance factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scope Ratings

Each analytical component is assessed on a three-point scale with notch adjustments of -1/3 for ‘weak’ assessments, 0 for ‘average’ assessments and +1/3 for ‘strong assessments for an overall maximum adjustment range of ± 3 notches. The adjustments are aggregated, with each assessment weighted such that each risk pillar is worth one full rating notch while the overall assessment is capped at ± 3 notches. Each adjustment is the assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses conducted in relation to peers with the same indicative rating, including the two adjacent ones (positive and negative). We document all steps of the process, including adjustment recommendations and their impact on the rating.

The QS assessment includes a comprehensive review of the qualitative factors detailed in Annex II. For each assessment, the analyst examines a given sovereign relative to its peer group. For this purpose, additional comparative analysis beyond the variables included in the SQM is conducted. The result is the implied QS notch adjustment, which is the basis for the analyst recommendation to the rating committee (see Annex IV for a country case study). The rating committee may adjust the rating beyond ± 3 notches under additional considerations not captured by the scorecard results.

5. Additional considerations

The rating committee may adjust the outcome of the SQM and QS to account for considerations or extraordinary circumstances not captured by our scorecards. Some examples are detailed below.

5.1 Official sector financial assistance

Here we look at sovereigns that are in discussions with the official sector regarding financial assistance, either on an ad hoc basis, or via established frameworks and initiatives. Key credit-relevant questions include whether i) official sector assistance is contingent on either policy reforms only, including the credibility of the adjustments to the policy mix, or as a last resort on private sector involvement (in the form of debt restructuring, implying a financial loss) and the associated estimate in potential burden sharing between the official and private sectors; ii) the assessment of gross financing needs and debt sustainability analysis are conducted before or after the request for private sector involvement; and iii) the official sector considers that potential burden sharing between official and private sectors is voluntary or not.

Our assessment of these negotiations can be either credit positive, credit neutral or credit negative. The severity of debt vulnerabilities and the scale of restructuring are shaped by many country-specific factors and assessed case by case. Generally, depending on i) pre-restructuring economic and fiscal conditions; ii) public debt structure; and iii) the state of the banking system and financial depth, we will view the following elements positively:

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This typically includes bilateral sovereign and/or multilateral creditors such as the IMF, World Bank, development agencies or export credit agencies.
• Formal requests to benefit from official financial assistance, regardless of conditionality and reviews; and/or
• Official assistance, which, with a high degree of confidence, is contingent not on private sector involvement but policy reform only.

Conversely, we would view negatively:

• Official assistance, which, with a high degree of confidence, is contingent on private sector involvement;
• Developments pointing to an imminent default before negotiations with the official sector end; and/or
• Failure of negotiations with the official sector that is likely to undermine debt servicing capacity in the long term.

Finally, situations where sovereigns are ineligible for, or indeed formally refuse to benefit from, restructuring frameworks or initiatives are credit-neutral.

5.2 Political risks and default history
Political risks related to domestic and external conflicts may materially weaken sovereign creditworthiness beyond the risks captured in our sovereign quantitative model. This may be particularly the case if sudden events or unforeseen political changes justify a re-assessment of this risk driver compared to the notch adjustments provided by our quantitative political risk driver (the World Bank’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator). Our qualitative adjustment can be either positive or negative compared to the quantitative notch adjustment from our model when this risk driver is material.

We also note that conflicts and political changes may directly or indirectly affect the perceived willingness of a sovereign to service debt beyond our quantitative assessment. Sovereigns, unlike corporates or financial institutions issuers, are not subject to bankruptcy laws and enforcement procedures and, despite having sufficient resources available, can thus deliberately choose not to repay debt. Default decisions are thus highly influenced by political developments. Examples include defaults occurring during war time or significant transitions of power (during which debt can be declared as ‘odious’). We examine a sovereign’s perceived willingness to pay by analysing its history of debt repayment, including to international donors and bilateral lenders.

5.3 Extraordinary circumstances
Finally, examples of extraordinary circumstances beyond official financial assistance and political conflicts are:

• a sovereign in crisis following a sharp economic downturn or financial crisis accompanied by a crisis of confidence, leading to a much higher default risk in the short term yet to be reflected in data or forecasts; and
• an exceptionally severe exogenous shock (natural disasters, sudden changes in market liquidity and capital flows) that strongly increases default risk.

We will communicate transparently these and any other extraordinary circumstances where the rating committee sees the need for greater adjustment flexibility (for example, capital controls, lack of capital market development) to incorporate sovereign fundamentals not captured by scorecard results.

24 Several empirical studies reviewed in Hatchondo and Martinez (2010) find that the proximity of elections, the turnover of government officials, increases in political instability, and less democratic political systems are statistically associated with a higher default probability.

25 The concept of odious debts was coined by the jurist Alexander Sack (1929). Odious debts are defined by Sack as debts contracted and spent against the interests of the population of a state, without its consent, and with full awareness of the creditor. These include war debts, subjugated or imposed debts, and regime debts.
### 6. Annex I: Sovereign quantitative model (SQM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP)</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of GDP per capita on a purchase-power-basis using past, current and five-year forecast; assessed in non-linear form (natural log)</td>
<td>The higher the GDP per capita, the broader the potential tax base the sovereign can rely on to pay its obligations. Moreover, a higher per-capita income is associated with higher productivity, as well as economic (stock of human and physical capital) and financial wealth (stock of financial assets).</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>Ln 4,000.0</td>
<td>Ln 80,000.0</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of share of Nominal GDP in World GDP using past, current and five-year forecast data; assessed in non-linear form (natural log)</td>
<td>Nominal GDP is used to account for a sovereign’s economic resilience to shocks and global economic clout.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Ln 0.02%</td>
<td>Ln 2.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of real GDP growth using past, current, and five-year forecast data</td>
<td>A country’s ability to generate sustainable long-term growth is important for its creditworthiness.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP volatility</td>
<td>Standard deviation of real GDP growth using data for the current and past 15 years</td>
<td>Highly volatile real GDP growth indicates the presence of imbalances in the economy and increases uncertainty about a sovereign’s ability to repay obligations fully and on time.</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of inflation rate (yearly percentage change in the consumer price index) using past, current, and five-year forecast.</td>
<td>Long periods of high inflation undermine the credibility of the local currency as a main storage of value; conversely, undermines economic growth through its detrimental effect on consumption and business confidence. Inflation rates between 1.5% and 2.5% receive the highest score.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0%; 1.5%</td>
<td>2.5%; 10.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Latest data on unemployment rate</td>
<td>High unemployment is usually associated with significant structural bottlenecks and can seriously hamper growth and weaken the country’s ability to adapt to new challenges.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Sovereign Rating Methodology
### Sovereign and Public Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public finance risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross debt/ revenue</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of gross debt as a percentage of government revenue using past, current and five-year forecast data; assessed in non-linear form (squared)</td>
<td>The gross debt ratio is a universal and comprehensive measure of sovereign indebtedness; relative to revenues it places the emphasis on a sovereign’s ability to mobilise revenues.</td>
<td>% of government revenue</td>
<td>Squared 75.0%</td>
<td>Squared 300.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest payments/ revenue</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of interest payments on debt as a percentage of revenues using past, current and five-year forecast data; assessed in non-linear form (squared)</td>
<td>Interest payments as a share of budget revenue displays a sovereign’s debt affordability.</td>
<td>% of government revenue</td>
<td>Squared 1.5%</td>
<td>Squared 15.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary balance/ GDP</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of primary balance as a percentage of GDP using past, current and five-year forecast data</td>
<td>A persistent primary budget deficit indicates a sovereign’s low capacity to service its debt from own resources and an overreliance on markets to refinance.</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross debt/ GDP</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of gross debt as a percentage of GDP using past, current and five-year forecast data; assessed in non-linear form (squared)</td>
<td>A persistent rise in a government’s debt to GDP ratio indicates a combination of a low capacity to consolidate public finances and/or weak growth prospects.</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>Squared 15.0%</td>
<td>Squared 120.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External economic risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net international investment position</td>
<td>Latest data on net international investment position as a percentage of GDP; if unavailable, the historical cumulative current account used as a proxy.</td>
<td>Recent crises have underscored the importance of external assets and liabilities as an important indicator of external vulnerability.</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>-75.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>EC, national banks, statistical offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
<td>Seven-year weighted average of current account as a percentage of GDP using past, current and five-year forecast</td>
<td>Large and persistent current account deficits signal the risk of depletion of net foreign assets/liquidity/foreign-exchange reserves, indicating weak international competitiveness. They also signal a shortage of domestic savings in the economy, which is covered by capital inflows from non-residents.</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Sovereign Rating Methodology

### Sovereign and Public Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserves/imports</td>
<td>Latest data on reserves expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and services</td>
<td>Sovereigns whose currencies are not widely used often mitigate associated external risks through the availability (and use) of their reserves.</td>
<td>Months coverage</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>IMF, WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial stability risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-performing loans</td>
<td>Latest data on non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans</td>
<td>Banks’ risky operations, assessed via asset quality, could pose a threat to macro-economic stability given the banking sector’s role as a collector of savings, intermediary between savers and borrowers, and a payment infrastructure provider.</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>IMF, WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 capital</td>
<td>Latest data on Tier 1 capital % risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>Weak capitalisation buffers could increase the risk for government interventions in case heightened portfolio weaknesses and/or elevated sovereign bond exposures.</td>
<td>% of risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector credit growth</td>
<td>Three-year change in in the outstanding private sector relative to GDP, based on two-year averages.</td>
<td>Excessive private sector credit growth could serve as an early warning for a banking crisis. It points to the build-up of financial vulnerabilities within the economy.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental (E), social (S) and governance (G) risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Transition risks</td>
<td>Latest data on fossil CO₂ emissions per USD 1,000 of GDP</td>
<td>Transitional risks refer to the likely economic and fiscal costs due to policy and regulatory actions to foster carbon-free economies. As and when policymakers and regulators adopt and expand carbon pricing mechanisms, economies and societies with a higher share of carbon-intensive industries and consumption patterns are likely to face higher i) economic costs, which include the structural change economies may have to undergo; and ii) fiscal costs, which include direct expenditures, investments and subsidies. In addition, the impact on sovereign risk may further materialise via trade channels when trade barriers for carbon-intensive products adversely impact domestic industries not subject to carbon-pricing at home.</td>
<td>Metric tonnes of CO₂equivalent</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>EDGAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Natural disaster risks</td>
<td>Latest data on greenhouse gas emissions per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>Metric tonnes of CO₂equivalent</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>EDGAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Natural disaster risks</td>
<td>Latest data on Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative country index scores</td>
<td>Sovereigns more exposed to natural disasters may face higher economic and fiscal costs due to more frequent and extreme weather conditions.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>ND-GAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Sources</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Resource risks</td>
<td>Latest data on biocapacity within a country’s borders/ ecological footprint of consumption measured in hectares of land.</td>
<td>Resource risks refer to a country’s biocapacity relative to its ecological footprint of consumption. Sovereigns with limited resources may face natural resource constraints (resource-security), which may vary depending on a country’s consumption and the available physical biocapacity within its borders. This risk may also be affected by i) trade policies; and ii) the availability and substitutability of raw resources.</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Global Footprint Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Old-age dependency ratio</td>
<td>Past and long-term weighted average of old-age dependency ratio with forecasts up to 2035; assessed in non-linear form (squared).</td>
<td>The old-age dependency ratio indicates the share of the population dependent on the workforce, thus capturing the demographic challenges a sovereign is likely to face.</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>Squared 5.0</td>
<td>Squared 35.0</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Income inequality</td>
<td>Latest data on income share of bottom 50%; if unavailable, regional average used as proxy.</td>
<td>Income inequality may lead to low social mobility (hindering human capital formation) and high social conflicts and corruption that impede sustainable economic growth and development.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>WID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Labour force participation</td>
<td>Latest data on labour force participation</td>
<td>The share of an economically active population affects economic growth not only directly by adding to total output but also indirectly by lowering hysteresis and contributing to a dynamic labour market.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sovereign Rating Methodology
Sovereign and Public Sector

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G: Control of corruption</td>
<td>Latest data on control of corruption</td>
<td>Public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. High (low) scores are associated with good (bad) governance, policymaking and lower (higher) sovereign risk.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Voice and accountability</td>
<td>Latest data on voice and accountability</td>
<td>A country's citizens’ ability to participate in selecting their government, in addition to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. High (low) scores are associated with good (bad) governance, policymaking and lower (higher) sovereign risk.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Rule of law</td>
<td>Latest data on rule of law</td>
<td>Agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts; likelihood of crime and violence. High (low) scores are associated with good (bad) governance, policymaking and lower (higher) sovereign risk.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Governance effectiveness</td>
<td>Latest data on governance effectiveness</td>
<td>Quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. High (low) scores are associated with good (bad) governance, policymaking and lower (higher) sovereign risk.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Regulatory quality</td>
<td>Latest data on regulatory quality</td>
<td>Ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. High (low) scores are associated with good (bad) governance, policymaking and lower (higher) sovereign risk.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five governance scores are averaged and assessed together.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve currency</strong></td>
<td>Latest weight (%) of currency in IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket</td>
<td>Sovereign bonds issued in currencies with global use in international capital markets enjoy higher liquidity in times of crisis and have a robust secondary market.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political risk</strong></td>
<td>Three-year average of latest data on political stability and absence of violence/terrorism.</td>
<td>The likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism, affects government stability and policy predictability and thus a sovereign’s ability and willingness to honour debt repayments.</td>
<td>Index score</td>
<td>See section 3.3.</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 7. Annex II: Qualitative scorecard (QS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Domestic economic risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Growth potential and outlook</strong></td>
<td>An examination of a country’s medium- to long-term growth potential and outlook</td>
<td>Medium- and long-term growth potential, in particular its innovative capacity, business environment, and human/physical capital accumulation, contributes to a sovereign’s capacity to generate revenues and repay debt.</td>
<td>Strong outlook, good growth potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 Monetary policy framework</strong></td>
<td>Assesses the coherence, credibility and effectiveness of a country’s monetary policy framework, including the effectiveness of prudential regulation in generating sustainable growth, curtailing macro-economic imbalances and supporting crisis resolution</td>
<td>Ineffective monetary policies characterised by a weak monetary policy transmission mechanism increase the risk of too high or too low growth, macro-economic imbalances and bubbles, too high or too low inflation, exchange rate volatility, and financial market shocks.</td>
<td>Good policies, effective implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3 Macro-economic stability and sustainability</strong></td>
<td>Assesses macro-economic imbalances arising from weak economic diversification and/or labour market rigidities</td>
<td>Sustainable economic growth increases resilience to adverse economic shocks and the ability to recover quickly following a shock.</td>
<td>Strong stability, only minor imbalances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Public finances risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.1 Fiscal policy framework</strong></td>
<td>Captures the fiscal framework and ability of the government to generate revenues, plan and control expenditure as well as assesses the consistency and appropriateness of budgetary policies and processes</td>
<td>The fiscal framework is key to preserving public debt sustainability and ensuring growth-friendly fiscal policies, mitigating the effects of economic downturns and shocks.</td>
<td>Strong fiscal flexibility; appropriate fiscal stance; effective and prudent fiscal framework;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All notch adjustments are taken in comparison with peers in the quantitatively derived indicative rating group*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Long-term debt trajectory</td>
<td>Assesses the debt trajectory of a sovereign under several scenarios and its resilience under sudden episodes of fiscal stress that may occur following the materialisation of economic, fiscal or financial risks.</td>
<td>Debt dynamics are analysed to assess medium-to long-term sustainability challenges, including contingent liabilities.</td>
<td>Declining trajectory and/or low debt burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Debt profile and market access</td>
<td>Assesses sovereign’s financing needs, debt composition, maturity, interest rate, and currency structure. This includes cash holdings and other liquid assets (sovereign wealth funds), the depth of the domestic capital markets, access to international capital markets, and access to concessional and multilateral sources of financing (including the safety net funds for a country member of a monetary union).</td>
<td>A sovereign with low financing needs, a debt structure characterised by a long maturity and a high share of fixed-rated debt will be less exposed to refinancing risk and interest rate shocks. Uninterrupted access to internal and external sources of funding allows debt to be rolled over. Liquid government assets can be sold to service debt if required.</td>
<td>Good debt structure and/or market access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 External economic risk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong (+1/3 notch)</td>
<td>Average (0 notches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Current account resilience</td>
<td>Assesses financing of current account and development of external imbalances arising from a non-diversified and/or narrow range of export markets, reliance on remittances.</td>
<td>Current account volatilities, if not counterbalanced, can put pressure on the local currency.</td>
<td>Strong resilience; reliable and/or stable current account financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 External debt structure</td>
<td>Assesses structure, composition, maturity, and ownership of external debt in both the public and private sectors.</td>
<td>High external private-sector debt may undermine foreign investors’ confidence in the economy, resulting in a decline in capital inflows and net outflows.</td>
<td>Low external debt; favourable structure and/or limited imbalances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.3 Resilience to short-term external shocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluates short-term liabilities of all sectors of the economy against liquid short-term assets and shows the ability to continue foreign exchange debt servicing if external markets are closed. For sovereigns with a reserve currency, this adjustment is only used under exceptional circumstances to avoid double-counting.</td>
<td>Sufficient internal foreign exchange sources boost resilience to market volatility and temporary shutdown in external markets.</td>
<td>Sufficient internal foreign exchange sources boost resilience to market volatility and temporary shutdown in external markets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4 Financial stability risk

#### 4.1 Banking sector performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyses main macro and micro-prudential indicators of financial soundness including asset quality, profitability, liquidity, and capital adequacy. Scope’s banking team analysts contribute to this assessment where relevant.</td>
<td>Weak funding structure, capital buffers, and stretched liquidity can undermine financial stability.</td>
<td>Very good performance and buffers; and/or favourable funding structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2 Financial sector oversight and governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluates policy measures to minimise systemic risks and support the banking system. This includes macro-prudential rules and policies as well as bank regulation standards that enhance resilience to shocks and contagion.</td>
<td>Strong financial sector oversight and sound corporate governance arrangements are a critical pillar of financial stability.</td>
<td>Strong oversight frameworks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3 Financial imbalances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluates the implications of financial imbalances for banks, in particular credit-fuelled growth, private sector indebtedness, sovereign-bank nexus and asset bubbles</td>
<td>Financial imbalances pose a material risk to macro-economic stability.</td>
<td>Limited imbalances and/or strong policy response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5 ESG risk

#### 5.1 Environmental factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assesses a country’s vulnerability to environmental risks as well as its government’s ability and commitment to address these risks, in particular the sectoral dependence on transition risks, supply chain-related risks and reliance on energy-intensive consumption.</td>
<td>Transition, physical and resource risks can have a profound impact on countries’ economic structures and developments with governments important in facilitating an appropriate policy and investment response.</td>
<td>Limited exposure; largely effective and coherent climate policies, some contradictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.2. Social factors</strong></td>
<td>Assesses a country’s demographic trends, income inequality, effectiveness of the education and health system and other social considerations as well as policy responses to discriminatory practices or regulatory hurdles to social inclusion.</td>
<td>Social considerations can have important consequences for a country’s growth potential, fiscal developments or political risks over the medium term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.3 Governance factors</strong></td>
<td>Assesses impact of major policy decisions and institutional developments.</td>
<td>Level of political risk and policy orientation as well as conflicts could cause deviation in the country’s fundamentals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scope Ratings
8. **Annex III: Foreign vs local currency sovereign defaults**

The history of defaults on foreign-currency versus local-currency rated debt is limited. This indicates a lack of a uniform relationship between the denomination of debt and the likelihood of default. A historical analysis of defaults conducted by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England reviews the annual number and volume of defaults in 1960-2022 on both local- and foreign-currency debt, tracking bank loans and bonds. As banks withdrew from sovereign lending over the past 25 years, defaults on foreign-currency bonds (rather than loans) have increased.

---

**Figure 10: Number of sovereigns in default (to private creditors)**

**Figure 11: Total debt in default, USD bn (to private creditors)**

Sources: Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Scope Ratings
To calculate the rating score within the SQM, we use a minimum-maximum algorithm to determine a rating score for each of the 28 indicators. We assess each rating indicator within the defined minimum and maximum thresholds. Sovereigns with the strongest (weakest) results for each indicator receive the highest (lowest) rating score. The score result translates to an indicative rating that is always presented in lower case rating notes and is adjusted automatically to account for reserve currency and political risk considerations. Within the QS assessment the analyst conducts a comprehensive review of the qualitative factors. This includes but is not limited to economic scenario analysis and a review of debt sustainability, fiscal and financial performance and policy implementation. Each category has three assessments for a total of 15. For each assessment, the analyst examines a given sovereign relative to its peer group. For this purpose, additional comparative analysis beyond the variables included in the SQM is conducted. These assessments are then aggregated using equal weights. The result is the implied QS notch adjustment, which is the basis for the analyst recommendation to the rating committee.
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Sovereign and Public Sector

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