


Global Economic Outlook Mid-Year 2025

Macroeconomic Council (MEC)





Agenda

 \rightarrow Global Economic Outlook – 2025 mid-year

 \rightarrow Annex



Core themes at mid-year:

- 1) Persistent macro-financial risks: tariff uncertainties, geopolitical tensions, and sovereign-debt concerns continue to weigh on economic and financial-market stability;
- 2) Moderate slowdown of global growth this year spear headed by the softer US growth;
- 3) Policy-driven market volatility: markets remain sensitive to shifting US tariff policies;
- 4) Sticky global inflation: inflation remains elevated globally, although risks for the 2% target have moderated for the euro area;
- 5) Higher rates for longer: more-elevated official and long-term financing rates compared against levels from before/during the pandemic crisis; and
- 6) Continued tight labour markets, supporting low levels of non-performing loans and the risk profiles of transactional credit.


Euro-area growth remains moderate and uneven. Strength in peripheral-European economies offsets weaknesses in Germany and France. Euroarea GDP is forecast to grow 1.1% in 2025, rising to 1.5% in 2026 – near the 1.3% potential rate (see slides <u>21</u>–24 for details).

<u>Global macro risks skewing "negatively"</u>: Medium-term risks are skewed to the downside, representing: (i) The potential escalation of trade tensions; (ii) Increased financial-market and financial-stability vulnerabilities; (iii) Rising sovereign-debt risks from fiscal pressures; (iv) Elevated geopolitical risks.

Financial-market developments. Global equities have rebounded, with European markets out-performing those of the United States. US and global yields remain elevated; euro-area yields have retreated from the March highs. Energy prices have risen amid Middle-East tensions. The euro has strengthened against the dollar. Credit spreads have narrowed but may under-price longer-run risks. 2s-10s yield curves have steepened for the US, UK and Germany.

The themes for the global outlook this year

On-again, off-again trade barriers under the Donald Trump administration ensure near-term economic slowdown.



Significant tariffs announced – despite a pause for extended negotiations

Tariff and counter-measures announced since the inauguration of US President Trump.

US blanket tariffs

- The 'reciprocal' tariffs: 10% baseline tariffs on most goods, effective since 5 April.
 - Country- or region-specific tariffs: 20% on the EU, 24% on Japan (suspended until 9 July). 50% tariffs on the EU threatened if talks fail.
- **China-specific tariffs**: initially 145% on most Chinese products. Reduced to 30% for 90 days on 12 May. An agreement in principle reached on 11 June maintaining the reduced tariff rates.
- **Canada and Mexico**: 25% baseline on non-United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) covered goods; 10% on Canadian energy and potash.
- Additional measures: 25% tariff barriers on importers of Venezuelan oil (not effective yet).

US sector-specific tariffs and exemptions

- **Steel and aluminium**: raised from 25% to 50% (UK exempted from 8 May). The tariffs were hiked to 50%.
- Automobiles & automotive parts (except for products already covered by Section 232 tariffs): 25% (reduced to 10% for the United Kingdom after a trade agreement).
- **Exemptions**: copper, pharmas, semi-conductors, lumber, certain critical minerals, and energy imports.

Counter-measures

- China: 125% tariff on all US goods; additional 10-15% tariffs on energy, agri-machinery and farm products.
 - Export restrictions on rare earths (partial relief agreed).
 - Trade restrictions on select US companies.
 - Import suspension on several agricultural products.

Tariffs cut for 90 days to 10% on 12 May. Reduced rate maintained after 11 June agreement.

- **Canada**: 25% tariffs on non-USMCA goods.
- EU: 4.4% to 50% duties on EUR 21bn of US goods suspended until 14 July.

Source: Scope Ratings.

Trade policy to stay volatile as the US President responds to political/legal, economic and market pressures

Escalation and de-escalation cycles persist with temporary concessions presenting short-run relief but risking future flare ups. The roll-out of tariffs slows after the recent conclusion of Trump's first 100 days amid rising judicial challenges but additional rounds are anticipated.

The consideration of US 28 May 2025: US court rules tariffs on semi-Trump overstepped his authority conductors and using a 1977 act to justify many 'Liberation day' tariff pharmaceuticals. country tariffs. The expiration of the announcements on 2 April 2025; their partial suspension of EU Section 232 The US Court of Appeals for the counter-measures on and temporary investigations into Federal Circuit more recently rules suspension on 9 April 14 July 2025. copper and lumber the tariffs can stay in place during 2025. concluding late appeals process, scheduling November 2025. arguments for 31 July. 8 May 2025: The UK and the US reach agreement reducing specific sectoral The 90-day cut of 115% Near term: intensive tariffs on imports from the UK. But 10% in US and China bilateral negotiations baseline tariffs on the UK stay in place. reciprocal tariffs ahead of the expiration of concludes on 12 August the suspension of higher 12 May: US reduces to 10% cumulative 2025. US reciprocal tariffs on 9 tariffs adopted on certain Chinese July 2025. Trump upped imports for 90 days. ante on 23 May threatening 50% tariffs on China reduces to 10% tariff rates on the European Union, later the US from 125%. suspended until 9 July.

US budgetary sustainability has become an increasing market concern

The fiscal sustainability of the United States has become an increasing risk factor.

20 January 2025: Trump is re-inaugurated, becoming the 47th President of the United States.

14 March 2025: Congress sidesteps a government shutdown by passing a continuing resolution funding the government for the remainder of fiscal 2025 (e.g., through 30 September 2025). 22 May 2025: The House of Representatives passes the "One Big Beautiful Bill", centring around an extension of 2017 tax cuts – sending to the Senate, where significant changes are being considered. The Penn Wharton Budget Model found the bill may increase primary deficits by USD 3.3trn over 10 years.

3 November 2026: midterm elections, during which the Republican Party must defend Senate and House of Representatives majorities.

The first one hundred days: At

least 121,000 federal workers were laid off or targeted for layoff by the Department of Government Efficiency and thousands more accepted buy-out offers.

16 May 2025: Moody's


downgrades the United States one notch to Aa1 from Aaa, removing the United States' final AAA credit rating from the three American rating agencies. August 2025: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent indicates the US Treasury may run out of cash to pay bills by this month unless the debt ceiling is hiked. Trump has threatened to abolish the debt ceiling.

The US elections and the response in the capital markets

Snapshot.

The financial-market reaction


Percentage point (or basis point for bonds) change since 5 November 2024 (the US elections)




As of 19 June 2025. Source: Scope Ratings, Macrobond.

Credit spreads have moderated after spiking this spring

Credit spreads have moderated from the recent highs.






Yield curves have steepened

US bonds have sold off as yield curves have furthermore steepened.









Source: Macrobond.

The sovereign yields within the euro area have reverted to near the levels from before an announcement of increased German defence expenditure


Euro-area sovereign yields have moderated from the recent highs.






US data have rebounded this quarter whereas European data remain soft

The data remain consistent with global slowdown this year – spear headed by US slowdown.






Composite Purchasing Managers' Surveys, Europe, SA, Index




Moderate global slowdown this year – spear headed by softer US growth

Our non-consensus baseline has correctly been for the soft landing of the <u>global</u> economy since 2022 against the repeated market prediction of recession during the years. The risks for the global expansion have increased after the US elections.



Unemployment rates remain near or at their record lows


The labour market is seen staying tight. The labour market continues to exert pressure on price increases.




Macroeconomic Council: Global Economic Outlook - Mid-Year 2025

Inflation expected to stay a continued issue

Our expectation remains for inflation to generally *average* above 2% across most economies this year. Nevertheless, inflation risks are more balanced for the euro-area economy – given the disinflationary effects for the region from the trade war.



Straight lines on graphic designate Scope forecasting for calendar-year average inflation in 2025 and 2026. Source: National/regional statistics bodies, Scope Ratings forecasts.




Source: Eurostat, national statistics, Scope Ratings.

Core inflation, % year-over-year

The long-standing expectation of higher steady-state rates

We have assumed since 2022 higher steady-state rates globally. This represents the assumption of the rate cuts of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England beginning later than markets have expected over these years and for ultimately the scale of rate reductions to prove less significant than the assumptions of policy makers, economists and markets.

Official rates



Straight lines on graphic designate Scope forecasting for year-ends 2025 and 2026. Source: Central banks, Scope Ratings forecasts.

A negative macro risk outlook

The negative skew of global macro and credit risks.


Upside potential for medium-run economic expectations represents the outstanding scenarios of:

- global expansionary budgetary policies anchoring domestic spending;
- a return of inflation to target or going below-target and monetary policy being eased more significantly than currently anticipated;
- resilient private demand as wages increase and labour markets stay strong; and/or
- structural reform and investment paying economic dividends.

The downside risks consider the potential of:

- the escalation of the trade war, de-globalisation and how this may provoke greater recessionary risks;
- **financial-market and financial-crisis risks** given higher steady-state rates, the effects of US and global financial de-regulation, tariff and global supply-chain risks, alongside geo-political stresses;
- government budgetary challenges triggering the further market re-appraisal of sovereign risks; and/or
- geo-political risks (Russia, US-centred conflicts and the Middle East) intensifying, affecting commodity prices and global supply chains.

Scope credit outlooks by sector





Agenda

 \rightarrow Global Economic Outlook – 2025 mid-year

 $\rightarrow \textbf{Annex}$



Annex – Scope: Macroeconomic Outlook – June 2025

Economic overview

GDP Growth	Inflation	Unemployment		Official F	Rates		Default Rates
Global slowdown near term and a downside skew of macro risks	Global inflation remaining sticky around or somewhat above 2%	Labour markets remaining tight across many advanced economies	-	fficial rates a out remain a pandemic	bove pre		Default rates across the wider corporate sector rising from low levels
2025 / 2026 (annual avgs) 1.1% / 1.5% Euro area 1.0% / 1.25% UK 3.0% / 3.1% Global growth	2025 / 2026 (annual avgs) 2.1% / 1.9% Euro area 3.3% / 2.7% UK 2.8% / 2.7% US	2025 / 2026 (annual avgs) 6.3% / 6.2% Euro area 4.5% / 4.5% UK 4.2% / 4.3% US	2024 (EOP) 2025 (EOP)	Fed 4.25- 4.5% 4-4.25%	BoE 4.75% 4.0%	ECB 3.0% 1.75%	
			2026 (EOP)	3.5-3.75%	3.5%	1.75%	

Upside risks	Downside risks
Expansionary budgetary policies 🗸	× Tariffs, de-globalisation and recessionary risks
Moderating inflation and rate cuts \sim	× Financial-market and financial-crisis risks
The resilience of private-sector demand \sim	× The market re-appraisal of sovereign debt risks
Structured reforms and investment \sim	× Geo-politics

Annex – Global economic outlook (June 2025): growth, inflation and official rates, euro area, 2022-2026F

		Real GDP growth (annual average, %)										dline inflat ual average		Policy rates (EOP, %)						
Country/region	2022	2023	2024E	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2025F	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2026F	Medium- run potential	2022	2023	2024E	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2025F	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2026F	End-2022	End-2023	End-2024	End-2025	End-2026
Euro area ³	3.6	0.4	0.8	↓ 0.2	1.1	↓ 0.5	1.5	1.3	8.4	5.4	2.4	↓ 0.0	2.1	↓ 0.1	1.9	2.0	4.0	3.0	1.75	1.75
Germany	1.4	(0.1)	(0.2)	↓ 0.2	0.0	↓ 0.9	1.2	0.8	8.7	6.0	2.5	↓ 0.0	2.3	-	1.8					
France	2.8	1.6	1.1	↑ 0.1	0.7	↓ 0.6	1.1	1.1	5.9	5.7	2.3	↓ 0.2	0.8	↓ 1.0	1.5					
Italy	5.0	0.8	0.5	↓ 0.3	0.6	↓ 0.4	0.8	0.9	8.7	5.9	1.1	↓ 0.1	1.9	↓ 0 .1	1.6					
Spain	6.2	2.7	3.2	↑ 0.8	2.5	↑ 0.3	1.8	1.75	8.3	3.4	2.9	↓ 0.1	2.3	-	1.9					
Netherlands	5.0	0.1	1.0	↑ 0.2	1.5	↓ 0.1	1.4	1.4	11.6	4.1	3.2	↑ 1.6	3.1	↑ 0.8	2.8					
Belgium	4.3	1.2	1.0	↓ 0.2	1.0	↓ 0.3	1.1	1.3	10.3	2.3	4.3	↑ 0.2	2.7	↑ 0.6	1.9					
Austria	5.4	(0.8)	(1.1)	↓ 1.6	(0.1)	↓ 1.7	1.3	1.0	8.6	7.7	2.9	↓ 0.9	3.4	↑ 1.0	2.0					
Ireland	8.7	(5.7)	1.3	↑ 1.0	5.0	↑ 0.7	4.0	3.2	8.1	5.2	1.3	↓ 1.7	1.9	↓ 1.0	2.0					
Finland	0.8	(0.9)	0.4	↑ 0.7	0.9	↓ 0.9	1.6	1.2	7.2	4.3	1.0	↓ 0.2	2.0	-	2.2					
Portugal	7.0	2.6	1.9	↑ 0.0	2.1	↓ 0.1	1.9	1.9	8.1	5.3	2.7	↓ 0.1	2.3	↑ 0.3	2.0					
Greece	5.7	2.3	2.3	↑ 0.3	2.1	↑ 0.3	1.8	1.25	9.3	4.2	3.0	↑ 0.3	3.1	↑ 0.5	2.5					
Slovakia	0.4	2.2	2.1	↓ 0.5	1.5	↓ 1.4	1.7	2.25	12.1	11.0	3.2	↓ 2.0	5.0	↑ 2.0	4.0					
Luxembourg	(1.1)	(0.7)	1.0	↓ 1.3	2.2	↓ 0.7	2.4	2.2	8.2	2.9	2.3	↓ 0.3	2.2	↓ 0.6	2.1					
Lithuania	2.5	0.4	2.7	↑ 0.5	2.8	-	3.0	2.5	18.9	8.7	0.9	↓ 0.2	3.9	↑ 1.1	2.4					
Slovenia	3.0	2.3	1.5	↓ 0.8	1.8	↓ 0.9	2.2	2.5	9.3	7.2	2.0	↓ 2.0	2.8	-	2.2					
Latvia	2.6	2.2	(0.4)	↓ 2.0	2.0	↓ 0.2	2.5	2.25	17.2	9.1	1.3	↓ 0.1	3.4	↑ 0.5	2.3					
Estonia	(0.0)	(3.1)	(0.3)	↑ 0.0	1.3	↓ 1.9	2.3	2.0	19.4	9.1	3.7	↓ 0.1	4.6	↑ 2 .3	4.5					
Cyprus	7.2	2.8	3.4	↑ 0.7	2.7	↓ 0.3	2.8	3.0	8.1	3.9	2.3	↓ 0.1	1.8	↓ 0.4	1.7					
Malta	4.3	6.8	5.9	↑ 1.7	3.9	↑ 00	3.9	3.5	6.1	5.6	2.4	↓ 0.5	2.1	↓ 0.2	2.0					
Croatia	7.2	3.3	3.9	↑ 0.6	2.8	↓ 0.3	2.6	2.8	10.7	8.4	4.0	↑ 0.3	4.2	↑ 1.6	2.8					

Negative values shown in parentheses. Presented for the 39 economies for which Scope publicly rates the sovereigns. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

1. Changes compared with Scope October-2024 <u>Global Economic Outlook</u> forecasting.

2. HICP headline inflation for euro-area member states.

3. Shown for the euro-area policy rate is the ECB deposit facility rate.

Annex – Global economic outlook (June 2025): growth, inflation and official rates, beyond the euro area, 2022-2026F

				Real GD (annual av								dline inflat ual average		Policy rates (EOP, %)						
Country/region	2022	2023	2024E	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2025F	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2026F	Medium- run potential	2022	2023	2024E	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2025F	Diff. from Oct-24 ¹	2026F	End-2022	End-2023	End-2024	-nd-2025	End-2026
Western Europe ex-euro are		2023	20246	00121	20231	00121	20201	potornau	LULL	2023	20246	00121	20231	00121	20201		LIIU-2023			
United Kingdom	4.8	0.4	1.1	↑ 0.1	1.0	↓ 0.5	1.25	1.4	9.1	7.3	2.5	↓0.1	3.3	↑ 0.5	2.7	3.5	5.25	4.75	4.0	3.5
Switzerland	3.1	0.7	1.4	↑ 0.4	0.9	↓ 0.5	1.8	1.5	2.8	2.1	1.1	↓ 0.5	0.3	↓ 1.7	0.6	1.0	1.75	0.5	(0.25)	(0.25)
Sweden	1.3	0.0	1.0	↑ 0.6	1.8	↓ 0.2	2.4	1.8	8.4	8.5	2.8	↓ 0.2	2.5	↑ 1.0	1.8	2.5	4.0	2.5	1.75	1.75
Norway	3.2	0.2	2.1	↑ 0.9	2.0	-	1.3	1.7	5.8	5.5	3.1	↓ 0.3	3.1	↑ 0.5	2.8	2.75	4.5	4.5	4.0	3.5
Denmark	1.5	2.5	3.7	↑ 1.6	3.2	↑ 1.3	2.0	1.5	7.7	3.3	1.4	↓ 0.6	1.7	↓ 0.2	1.5	1.75	3.6	2.6	1.35	1.35
EU central and eastern Euro	pe ex-euro																			
Poland	5.5	0.1	2.9	↑ 0.4	3.1	-	2.8	3.0	14.4	11.4	3.8	↓ 0.3	3.7	↓ 1.9	3.5	6.75	5.75	5.75	4.75	3.75
Romania	4.0	2.4	0.8	↓ 1.6	1.4	↓ 1.4	2.3	3.5	13.8	10.4	5.6	↓ 0.4	4.9	↑ 0.4	3.7	6.75	7.0	6.5	5.75	5.25
Czech Republic	2.9	0.1	1.0	↑ 0.4	2.1	↓0.1	2.4	2.25	15.1	10.7	2.4	↑ 0.2	2.4	↑ 0.5	1.8	7.0	6.75	4.0	3.25	2.75
Hungary	4.3	(0.7)	0.5	↓ 1.7	1.2	↓2.1	3.0	2.75	14.6	17.1	3.7	↓ 0.3	4.9	↑ 1.1	4.3	13.0	10.75	6.5	6.5	5.75
Bulgaria	4.1	2.0	2.7	↑ 0.3	2.6	↓ 0.4	3.0	2.75	15.3	9.5	2.4	↓ 0.1	3.6	↑ 1.0	1.7	1.3	3.75	3.04	1.57	n/a
Non-EU emerging Europe																				
Türkiye	5.5	5.1	3.2	↓ 0.3	2.8	↓ 0.4	3.2	3.8	72.3	53.9	58.5	↑ 3.5	37.5	↑ 7.5	22.5	9.0	42.5	47.5	40.0	35.0
Ukraine	(28.8)	5.5	2.9	↓ 0.8	2.75	↓ 0.8	3.5	2.5	20.2	12.8	6.5	↑ 1.0	14.0	↑ 6.9	8.3	25.0	15.0	13.5	15.5	12.0
Serbia	2.6	3.8	3.9	↑ 0.3	3.2	↓ 1.2	3.5	4.0	12.0	12.4	4.7	↑ 0.3	4.0	↑ 0.6	3.2	5.0	6.5	5.75	5.25	5.0
Georgia	11.0	7.8	9.4	↑ 1.9	7.5	<u>↑</u> 2.1	6.5	5.0	11.9	2.5	1.1	↓ 0.5	3.8	↑ 0.9	3.1	11.0	9.5	8.0	8.0	7.5
Rest of World (Advanced)																				
United States	2.5	2.9	2.8	↓ 0.0	1.8	↓ 0.9	1.8	2.0	8.0	4.1	2.9	↑ 0.0	2.8	↑ 0.3	2.7	4.25-4.5	5.25-5.5	4.25-4.5	4-4.25	3.5-3.75
China ⁴	3.0	5.2	5.0	↑ 0.0	4.8	↑ 0.3	4.5	4.0	1.9	0.3	0.2	↓ 0.3	(0.2)	↓ 2.0	1.0	3.65	3.45	3.1	2.75	2.5
Japan⁵	0.9	1.4	0.2	↑ 0.2	0.7	↓ 0.2	0.9	0.4	2.5	3.2	2.7	↑ 0.1	3.5	↑ 1.2	2.5	(0.1)	(0.1)	0.25	0.75	1.0
Africa																				
South Africa	2.1	0.8	0.5	↓ 0.3	0.7	↓ 0.7	1.3	1.5	7.0	6.1	4.4	↓ 0.3	3.2	↓ 1.1	3.7	7.0	8.25	7.75	7.0	6.75
Morocco	1.4	3.8	3.2	↑ 0.2	3.8	↑ 0.5	3.5	3.0	6.7	6.1	1.0	↓ 2.5	2.3	↓ 0.6	2.4	1.5	3.0	2.5	2.25	2.0
World	3.6	3.5	3.3	↓ 0.0	3.0	↓ 0.4	3.1	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	↓ 5.8	4.3	↓ 0.1	3.8					

Negative values shown in parentheses. Presented for the 39 economies for which Scope publicly rates the sovereigns. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.

1. Changes compared with Scope October-2024 Global Economic Outlook forecasts.

4. Shown for China's policy rate is the one-year bank prime loan rate.

5. Shown for Japan's policy rate is the deposit rate on current account balances.

Annex – Global economic outlook (June 2025): unemployment and fiscal metrics, euro area, 2022-30F

Country/region			ployment al average				Gen	eral govern (% of (nce		General government debt level (% of GDP)							
	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2030F	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2030F		
Euro area	6.8	6.6	6.4	6.3	6.2	(3.5)	(3.5)	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.1)	90	87	88	88	89	90		
Germany	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	(2.1)	(2.5)	(2.8)	(2.4)	(2.8)	(4.0)	65	63	63	63	64	71		
France	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.4	(4.7)	(5.4)	(5.8)	(5.6)	(5.3)	(4.0)	111	110	113	116	119	122		
Italy	8.1	7.7	6.6	6.0	5.8	(8.1)	(7.2)	(3.4)	(3.3)	(3.0)	(2.5)	138	135	135	137	138	137		
Spain	13.1	12.2	11.4	10.8	10.4	(4.6)	(3.5)	(3.2)	(2.7)	(2.6)	(2.5)	110	105	102	101	99	92		
Netherlands	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	4.0	0.0	(0.4)	(0.9)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(3.0)	48	45	43	43	44	49		
Belgium	5.6	5.5	5.7	5.9	5.8	(3.6)	(4.1)	(4.5)	(5.0)	(5.0)	(4.8)	103	103	105	106	109	117		
Austria	4.7	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.5	(3.4)	(2.6)	(4.7)	(4.1)	(3.7)	(3.0)	78	79	82	83	84	85		
Ireland	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.2	1.7	1.5	4.3	1.3	1.2	0.6	43	43	41	36	34	28		
Finland	6.8	7.2	8.4	8.5	8.1	(0.2)	(3.0)	(4.4)	(3.8)	(3.2)	(2.7)	74	78	82	86	87	90		
Portugal	6.2	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.3	(0.3)	1.2	0.7	0.3	0.2	(0.2)	111	98	95	91	87	75		
Greece	12.5	11.0	10.1	8.7	8.4	(2.5)	(1.4)	1.3	(0.2)	(0.3)	(1.3)	177	164	154	145	139	130		
Slovakia	6.2	5.8	5.4	5.1	5.1	(1.7)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(4.6)	(4.4)	(4.5)	58	56	60	59	62	70		
Luxembourg	4.6	5.2	6.3	5.8	6.1	0.2	(0.8)	1.0	(0.6)	(1.0)	(0.8)	25	25	26	26	26	27		
Lithuania	5.9	6.8	7.1	6.9	7.2	(0.7)	(0.7)	(1.3)	(3.0)	(2.6)	(2.0)	38	37	38	41	43	45		
Slovenia	4.0	3.6	3.7	3.2	3.1	(3.0)	(2.6)	(0.9)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(2.0)	73	68	67	66	65	59		
Latvia	6.8	6.5	6.9	6.9	7.0	(4.9)	(2.4)	(1.8)	(3.4)	(3.0)	(2.8)	44	45	47	49	50	51		
Estonia	5.6	6.4	7.6	8.6	8.9	(1.1)	(3.1)	(1.5)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(2.5)	19	20	24	25	27	34		
Cyprus	6.3	5.8	4.9	4.7	4.8	2.7	1.7	4.3	3.5	3.2	1.5	81	74	65	61	56	40		
Malta	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.1	3.0	(5.2)	(4.7)	(3.7)	(3.3)	(2.9)	(2.7)	50	48	47	49	50	50		
Croatia	6.7	6.1	5.1	4.5	4.4	0.1	(0.8)	(2.4)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.3)	69	62	58	56	55	54		

Negative values shown in parentheses. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF. 6. Unemployment rate data source is Eurostat for EU member states.

Annex – Global economic outlook (June 2025): unemployment and fiscal metrics, beyond the euro area, 2022-30F

Country/region			ployment al average				Gene	eral govern (% of (nce		General government debt level (% of GDP)							
	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2030F	2022	2023	2024E	2025F	2026F	2030F		
Western Europe ex-euro are	a		_									_							
United Kingdom	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.5	(4.6)	(6.1)	(5.7)	(4.9)	(4.3)	(3.6)	100	100	101	104	106	111		
Switzerland	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.8	1.2	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.1	37	39	38	37	36	32		
Sweden	7.5	7.7	8.4	8.6	8.4	1.0	(0.8)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(0.7)	0.0	34	32	34	34	34	31		
Norway	3.2	3.6	4.0	3.9	4.3	25.5	16.5	13.2	13.2	11.3	9.7	36	44	43	43	43	40		
Denmark	4.5	5.1	6.2	5.9	5.7	3.4	3.3	4.5	2.3	2.2	(0.8)	34	34	31	28	26	24		
EU central and eastern Euro	pe ex-euro																		
Poland	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	(3.4)	(5.3)	(6.6)	(5.7)	(4.8)	(3.0)	49	50	56	55	60	64		
Romania	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.4	(5.8)	(5.6)	(8.6)	(7.7)	(7.0)	(5.5)	52	52	57	59	63	72		
Czech Republic	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	(3.1)	(3.8)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(1.9)	(2.1)	43	42	43	44	45	46		
Hungary	3.7	4.1	4.4	4.3	4.1	(6.2)	(6.7)	(4.9)	(4.2)	(3.8)	(3.1)	74	73	74	73	72	70		
Bulgaria	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.4	3.3	(0.8)	(3.0)	(3.0)	(3.0)	(3.1)	(3.2)	23	23	24	27	28	34		
Non-EU emerging Europe																			
Türkiye ⁷	10.5	9.4	8.7	9.5	9.5	(1.0)	(5.2)	(4.9)	(3.9)	(3.5)	(2.6)	31	29	26	25	26	24		
Ukraine ⁷	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	(16.1)	(20.4)	(17.6)	(18.4)	(10.9)	(4.5)	78	84	91	103	104	97		
Serbia	9.6	9.4	8.6	8.5	8.0	(0.1)	(1.2)	(1.7)	(3.0)	(2.1)	(2.2)	51	46	44	48	47	46		
Georgia	17.3	16.4	13.9	14.5	14.0	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.1)	39	39	36	36	35	35		
Rest of World (Advanced)																			
United States	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.3	(3.7)	(7.2)	(7.3)	(6.4)	(7.1)	(6.9)	119	119	121	122	124	133		
China ⁸	5.6	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.2	(7.3)	(6.7)	(7.3)	(8.4)	(8.2)	(8.2)	75	82	88	98	105	122		
Japan	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	(4.2)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(3.0)	(3.2)	(5.3)	248	240	237	234	232	231		
Africa																			
South Africa	33.5	32.4	32.6	33.0	33.0	(4.3)	(5.4)	(6.1)	(5.8)	(5.7)	(5.4)	71	73	76	79	80	87		
Morocco	11.9	13.0	13.4	12.5	12.7	(5.4)	(4.5)	(4.1)	(3.9)	(3.5)	(3.2)	72	69	70	69	68	67		
World																			

Negative values shown in parentheses. Source: Scope Ratings forecasts, Macrobond, IMF.


6. Unemployment rate data source is Eurostat for EU member states; national unemployment series otherwise.

7. Türkiye and Ukraine budget-balance figures are on their <u>central-government</u> budget balances.

8. Unemployment for China is survey-based urban unemployment.

Annex – Scope sovereign-rating levels* compared against US agency averages (notches)

Scope predicted early the 2022 and 2024 Eurobond debt restructurings of Ukraine (the sovereign currently rated selective default).



Rating difference*, Scope versus the average rating from the US rating agencies (notches)

US agency average represents the mean of Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings. Represents Scope Ratings' portfolio of 39 publicly-rated sovereigns. Calculated based on an alpha-numeric conversion on a 20-point scale from AAA (20) to D (1) with US agency ratings adjusted to the Scope rating scale. Positive/Negative Outlooks are treated with a +/-0.33 adjustment. Credit Watch positive/negative with a +/-0.67 adjustment. *Long-term issuer ratings in foreign currency. As of 13 June 2025.

Annex – Platforms for accessing Scope macro projections





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